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The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran has significantly shaped and impacted developments 
in the Near and Middle East and inspired the regional rise of Shia Islam. Iran’s Islamic 
government has consistently played a leading role in promoting anti-Western and anti-
American sentiments within the global context of Islamic radicalization. It is imperative, 
therefore, that United States government officials more fully understand the role of 
religion in Iran’s approach to international relations.   
This thesis topic fulfills a specific and important knowledge gap in understanding 
Iran’s religious beliefs as trigger points for strategic actions against the United States. In 
particular, this research examines Iran’s religious tools and sacred carriers as potential 
triggers in the form of individual leaders, end-times beliefs, religious traditions, or divine 
justifications. It explores Iran’s end-times beliefs, to include how the earth will be 
governed before the Day of Judgment, and the extent to which these millenarian beliefs 
might affect the regime’s actions.  
Using primary source documents from Iran’s most influential contemporary 
leaders, this research project revealed three major narratives that are central to the self-
preservation of the Iranian regime: 1) establishing a government representing true or pure 
Islam; 2) protecting the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Revolution; and 3) fighting 
oppression and imperialism. These narratives serve as the backdrop to understanding 
Iran’s religious options—the sacred carriers and tools—that could play a key role in 
future Iranian aggression directed at the United States.  
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This thesis topic fulfills a specific and important knowledge gap in the U.S. 
policymaker’s understanding of Iran’s religious beliefs as trigger points for strategic 
actions against the United States. Trigger points are sacred carriers in the form of 
individual leaders, end-times beliefs, religious traditions, or divine justifications for 
starting political, military, or terrorist operations against the United States. A sacred 
carrier is “a means through which vitally important values are sustained and passed on in 
cultures and something true believers are willing to die for.”1 This thesis also examines, 
as a major element of Iran’s religious beliefs, the country’s Shia end-times doctrine on 
how the earth will be governed before the Day of Judgment, and the extent to which these 
millenarian beliefs might affect the regime’s actions.   
As a theocracy, which holds elections but actually functions as a dictatorship, 
Iran’s religious hierarchy has ultimate authority over the nation-state administration. 
According to the Iranian constitution, the ultimate authority in Iran is a Grand Ayatollah, 
a Supreme Leader who also functions as a sacred carrier—one who serves as a source of 
emulation for Shia Muslims.2  Iran, therefore, can and does use religion to justify 
strategic actions.   
The purposes of this research are twofold, applied and conceptual:  1) to assist 
U.S. policymakers, Intelligence Community members, and homeland security 
practitioners in understanding Iranian sacred carriers, religious tools, and end-times 
justifications for political, military, and/or terrorist actions against the United States; and 
2) to contribute to the research body and understanding of this issue. The research 
question asks:  What sacred carriers and religious tools could the Iranian regime use to 
mobilize or launch attacks against United States interests at home or abroad?  This 
exploratory study does not try to predict whether Iran would act upon its religious beliefs 
or the types of action it might employ. Rather, it examines the religious options—the 
1 Fathali Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship (Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association, 2013), 92. 
2 Ibid., 168. 
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sacred carriers and tools—that could play a key role in future Iranian aggression directed 
at the United States.  
A.   BACKGROUND 
Iran, formerly known as Persia, is home to almost 80 million people.3 The 
majority of Iranians identify with a strong sense of Persian nationalism, history, and 
culture. Knowing contemporary Iran, however, requires a thorough understanding of Shia 
Islam—particularly the Twelver branch—and the context surrounding Iranian history and 
current events dating back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.   The 1979 revolution in Iran 
marked the overthrow of the U.S.-backed monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and 
the establishment of an Islamic government led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 
Twelver Shi’ism, also known as Twelvers, is the sect of Shia Islam practiced by 
Iran’s Supreme Leader and the majority of Iran’s Muslims.4 Twelvers believe in a line of 
12 imams who are the divinely ordained political and religious leaders of Islam and direct 
descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. The twelfth imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi, went 
into occultation in 873 CE as a child. Twelvers believe that the Mahdi will return to 
redeem Islam by defeating its enemies and rule the world under Islamic law.5 In essence, 
the Iran’s Supreme Leader considers himself a placeholder for the return of the Mahdi 
and, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, can exercise “the missing Imam’s authority on 
Earth.”6  
Since the death of Khomeini in 1989, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues as a 
theocracy, and is supervised by Khomeini’s successor, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei. The Iranian constitution grants the Supreme Leader authority over all 
branches of the Iranian government to include the military and the state-run media. The 
3 “ The Iran Primer,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed July 18, 2014, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/.  
4 Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), xi, xiii. 
5 Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, Islamic Messianism: The Idea of Mahdī in Twelver Shīʻism 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1981), 1–3, 182–183. 
6 Karim Sadjadpour, “The Supreme Leader,” The Iran Primer, accessed October 6, 2013, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/supreme-leader. 
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Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formed after the 1979 revolution to 
protect the Islamic Republic and its Supreme Leader. The IRGC’s top commanders report 
to directly to Ayatollah Khamenei.  
The Supreme Leader and IRGC retain control over Iran’s most lethal weapons 
systems as well as Iran’s economic lifeline—the oil and gas industry—and they act as 
patron to Hezbollah, a Lebanese-based Shia terrorist organization capable of operating 
worldwide. The regime also supports Hamas, a militant Palestinian Sunni organization, in 
their resistance against Israel. Perhaps of most concern to the United States and Israel, 
however, is the wide held belief that Iran—through its uranium enrichment program—
may be close to developing a nuclear weapon, which would significantly change the 
balance of power in the Middle East. Khamenei and the ruling clergy in Iran, for the most 
part, continue to perceive the U.S. and Israel as enemies, oppressors, and direct threats to 
the tenets of the Islamic Republic.     
B.   FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Using a grounded theory approach, this research project explored and surveyed 
numerous primary source documents from Iran’s most influential contemporary leaders. 
The findings revealed three major narratives that are central to the self-preservation of the 
Iranian regime: 1) establishing a government representing true or pure Islam; 2) 
protecting the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Revolution; and 3) fighting oppression 
and imperialism. These narratives serve as the backdrop or context for the sacred carriers 
and religious tools the Iranian regime could use to mobilize or launch attacks against U.S. 
interests at home or abroad. 
1.   Iran’s Sacred Carriers 
The following sacred carriers stood out as the most relevant within major 
narratives described above:  a) the Supreme Leader of Iran, b) the Day of Ashura 
commemoration, and c) al-Mahdi—the Hidden Imam and promised savior in Twelver 
Shia Islam.   For the purposes of this research, a sacred carrier plays the role of a catalyst, 
a trigger, or an enabler to further propagate meaning and action. The following bullet 
points briefly describe each sacred carrier.   
 xvii 
• The position of Supreme Leader in Iran is perhaps the most powerful 
sacred carrier at this point in Iran’s post-revolutionary history. Not only is 
the Supreme Leader the primary decision-maker in the Islamic Republic, 
he is also the deputy to the Hidden Imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi. While 
not all Iranians agree with the religious teachings of the current Supreme 
Leader, Ali Khamenei, it is his position as the IRGC commander-in-chief, 
and his political control over the three branches of government that makes 
him a living sacred carrier and the ultimate authoritarian in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.7 
• The Day of Ashura (the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram) 
marks the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the prophet 
Mohammed, and, according to Shia tradition, the rightful heir and divinely 
mandated leader of Islam. The commemoration of the Day of Ashura, 
therefore, represents a very powerful sacred carrier not only as a ritualistic 
tradition, but more importantly, as a sign of religious identity.8 
• The twelfth “hidden” Imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi, believed by the Shia to 
be the promised savior of Islam, also functions as divinely appointed 
sacred carrier. It is al-Mahdi, the “Lord of the Age” who, according to 
Shia doctrine, will return to establish justice and Islamic law throughout 
the world. Moreover, the mere belief in the final appearance of al-Mahdi 
as Allah’s appointed future world leader becomes a sacred carrier with 
millenarian implications.   
2.   Religious Tools 
If the sacred carriers are the means “through which vitally important values are 
sustained and passed, and something true believers are willing to die for,”9 then the tools 
are complimentary, and become the mechanism for carrying out a potential religious 
action. The following religious tools are highlighted because they have been used by the 
Iranian regime in the past to mobilize followers for religious reasons, and/or the tool 
could pose a significant security risk or threat to the United States and Israel. Therefore, 
the primary religious tools described below include, but are not limited to:  1) the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij militia, 2) Hezbollah, 3) martyrdom operations, 4) 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 5) Friday prayers and the mosque, and 
6) mass media, social media and propaganda. 
7 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 96–97. 
8 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2007), Kindle Locations 240–243. 
9 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 92. 
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• The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) functions as a religious 
toolbox, with its many conventional and asymmetric military units that 
serve to protect the Iranian regime. This includes its elite Qods force, 
which facilitates and conducts external operations worldwide, and the 
Basij Resistance Force or militia in charge of internal security. 
• Hezbollah, a Lebanese-based Shia terrorist organization capable of 
operating worldwide, functions as Iran’s proxy terrorist group. Hezbollah, 
translated as “Party of God,” emerged in the mid-1980s as a Lebanese-
based resistance movement against Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. The 
organization has since grown to become a strong military force and a 
powerful political party in Lebanon. Iran’s IRGC Qods Force was the 
driving force that created, funded, and trained Hezbollah in Lebanon.       
• Martyrdom operations in the form of “human wave” attacks were used 
extensively by Iran during the Iran–Iraq War (1980—1988). Depicted by 
the Khomeini regime as a battle between “good and evil,” thousands of 
young men volunteered for martyrdom and became part of the “human 
wave” attacks against the Iraqi Army—using their bodies to detonate land 
mines and assault well-fortified Iraqi gun positions and tanks.10  As Shia 
Muslims memorialize the theme of martyrdom through the sacrifice of 
Husayn on the Day of Ashura, martyrs from the Iran–Iraq War to this day 
are remembered and celebrated in Iran.   
• The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a religious tool, 
formally abolished the monarchy and permanently enshrined an Islamic 
system of governance. Ratified by the people in October 1979, Iran’s 
constitution declares Twelver Shi’ism as the official state religion and 
articulates how this brand of Islamic law and government is to be enacted.  
• Friday prayers are held just after noon usually in the town or 
neighborhood mosque. The Friday prayer is a communal prayer, which 
takes the place of the second of the five prayers Muslims offer daily. It is 
not uncommon for the Friday prayer message to be coordinated or directed 
by the religious elite and the Supreme Leader. The Friday prayer, 
therefore, becomes the weekly stopping point when faithful Muslims 
assemble, pray, and listen to what the ruling religious class in Iran wants 
them to understand and do.    
• The media in all its forms is a tool at the regime’s disposal to disseminate 
political and religious propaganda both inside and outside Iran. The ruling 
religious class in the Islamic Republic has essentially cleared the airwaves 
for the regime’s preferred discourse by restricting the press, and banning 
access to YouTube and social media sites. Despite their own ban on social 
media, the supreme leader and other government officials use multiple 
10 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, Kindle Locations 1619–
1634. 
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social media platforms—mostly in English and Arabic—to broadcast a 
specific message outside Iran’s borders.   
C.   PROJECT CONCLUSIONS 
The findings and subsequent analyses from this research project do not suggest 
that the Iranian religious elite would sacrifice the regime’s existence for an “all out” 
apocalyptic or purely religious war. For the most part, Iran will act as a pragmatic nation-
state as it seeks to improve its economy, exploit its natural resources, and shore up its 
armed forces to defend the country and protect the regime. Most experts and scholars 
agree, however, that Iran’s decision-making process is extremely complex and, more 
often than not, unpredictable.   
The findings and analyses do indicate, however, that Iran would utilize the power 
of its sacred carriers and religious tools to complement an asymmetric war against the 
United States or to mobilize forces for a larger campaign or war, if needed. The evidence 
examined in the analysis supports the concept that Iran is using, and will continue to use, 
religious tools as part of a low profile, asymmetric war against the United States and 
Israel. Furthermore, the findings show the regime’s prolific use of social media—a tool 
the Supreme Leader uses, in part, to propagate religious ideology to a regional and 
worldwide audience.  
Understanding Iran’s true intent and whether it reflects reality is a difficult, if not 
impossible, task. There are no clear cause-and-effect markers that can predict Iran’s next 
moves that are of consequence to the United States. However, as this thesis demonstrates 
and suggests, the religious tools and sacred carriers could be thought of as markers (or 
signs) within the context of Iran’s larger religious narratives. In essence, the markers and 
narratives can help provide the context behind the rhetoric, and give meaning to action.   
Finally, this thesis recommends the Cynefin framework (pronounced ku-nev-in) 
as a method for U.S. policymakers and Western analysts to view and understand Iran. 
David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone developed the Cynefin framework in the late 
1990s to help executives “see things from new viewpoints, assimilate complex concepts, 
 xx 
and address real-world problems and opportunities.”11  Of the five “sense-making” 
domains explained in the Cynefin framework, the “complex domain” best describes the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. By examining religious patterns, narratives and markers within 
the complex domain, and then applying the framework’s corresponding decision-making 
strategy, U.S. policymakers and analysts might more accurately interpret Iran’s complex 
scenarios—and make better decisions vis-à-vis Iran.   
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis topic fulfills a specific knowledge gap in U.S. policymakers’ 
understanding of Iran’s religious beliefs as trigger points for strategic actions against the 
United States. Trigger points are sacred carriers in the form of individual leaders, end-
times beliefs, religious traditions, or divine justifications for starting political, military, or 
terrorist operations against the U.S. A sacred carrier is “a means through which vitally 
important values are sustained and passed on in cultures and something true believers are 
willing to die for.”1  This thesis also examines, as a major element of Iran’s religious 
beliefs, the country’s Shia end-times doctrine on how the earth will be governed before 
the Day of Judgment, and the extent to which these millenarian beliefs might affect the 
regime’s actions.   
As a theocracy, which holds elections but actually functions as a dictatorship, 
Iran’s religious hierarchy holds ultimate authority over the nation-state administration. 
According to the Iranian constitution, the ultimate authority in Iran is a Grand Ayatollah, 
a Supreme Leader who also functions as a sacred carrier—one who serves as a source of 
emulation for Shia Muslims.2  Iran, therefore, can and does use religion to justify 
strategic actions.   
The “religious trigger,” often signals a dividing line between Iran’s hardliners—
who continually press for a strict manifestation of Islamic values—and the relative 
moderates currently led by Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, who favors a relaxing of 
Islamic values and more dialogue with the West.3  Iran’s conservative or hardliner 
clerics, for example, supported former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rise to power 
in 2005 with the belief that religious laws and values would “once again receive [due] 
1 Fathali Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship (Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association, 2013), 92. 
2 Ibid., 168. 
3 Fathali Moghaddam (online discussion, Center for Homeland Defense and Security Thesis Center 
Forum, August 8, 2014). 
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attention” after they had been weakened during reformist President Khatami’s two-terms 
in office (1997—2005).4  Therefore, the hardliners and moderates in Iran are involved in 
a constant “tug of war” with the hardliners continually asserting their power by 
promoting Islamic ideals and provoking Western powers.5  Iran’s Supreme Leader, then, 
becomes the ultimate arbiter—the man who has the “final say on many issues, especially 
when it comes to foreign policy and the nuclear issue.”6   
The purposes of this research are twofold, applied and conceptual:   
1. To assist U.S. policymakers, Intelligence Community members, and 
homeland security practitioners, in understanding Iranian sacred carriers, 
religious tools, and end-times justifications for political, military, and/or 
terrorist actions against the U.S., and  
2. To contribute to the research body and understanding of this issue. 
While the premise of this thesis explores Iran’s potential use of religious beliefs 
as triggers for strategic actions against the United States, this study begins with an 
important assumption:  that Iran will first and foremost act as a pragmatic nation state.   
Ray Takeyh, in his book Guardians of the Revolution, underscores the notion that “Iran’s 
rulers should not be caricatured as messianic politicians seeking to implement obscure 
scriptural dictates for ushering in the end of the world through conflict and disorder. As 
with most leaders, they are interested in staying in power and will recoil from conduct 
that jeopardizes their domain.”7  It is assumed then, more often than not, that Iran’s 
ruling religious elite—moderate and conservative alike—will generally make practical 
decisions within a framework of Shia Islamic jurisprudence to strengthen their power, 
and the country’s standing in the region and world. The focus here is on the use of 
religion as a means to mobilize support, influence events, and perpetuate the regime.  
4 A. Savyon and Y. Mansharof, The Doctrine of Mahdism: In the Ideological and Political Philosophy 
of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Mesbah-eYazdi (Washington, DC: Middle East Media Research 
Institute, May 2007), 7, http://www.memri.org/publicdocs/doctrine_of_mahdism.pdf. 
5 Moghaddam, online discussion, August 8, 2014. 
6 Mehdi Khalaji, Tightening the Reins: How Khamenei Makes Decisions (Washington, DC: The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2014), 4, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/tightening-the-reins-how-khamenei-makes-decisions. 
7 Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 257. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
On November 4, 1979, young (and mostly student) supporters of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution of Iran stormed the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran. The students—outraged that the deposed Shah of Iran had been admitted to the 
United States for medical treatment—captured 66 Americans and demanded the 
immediate release of the Shah in exchange for their prisoners. Opportunistically backed 
by Khomeini and fueled by a conspiracy theory that the United States was plotting to 
overthrow the Islamic revolution, the hostage takers held 52 American diplomats for 444 
days.8  
Although many in Iran opposed the U.S. Embassy siege, the radical hardliners 
were willing to use violence to crush opposition.9  Their brute force tactics were spurred 
on as the U.S. would not agree to extradite the Shah. Eventually, the U.S. Embassy siege 
rallied the public behind Khomeini, helping him to ultimately dismiss Iran’s provisional 
government led by the moderate Prime Minister Mehdi Barzargan. Shortly thereafter, 
Iran passed a constitutional referendum based on the concept of an Islamic Republic—a 
theocratic regime with direct clerical oversight of the government.10 In the wake of the 
1979 hostage crisis, and the ensuing formation of an Islamic government, the United 
States and Iran severed official diplomatic relations. As a result, the subsequent 
relationship between the two countries has been marked by more than 30 years of 
animosity, distrust, and misunderstanding. 
Since the death of Khomeini in 1989, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues as a 
theocracy, and is supervised by Khomeini’s successor, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei. The Iranian constitution grants the Supreme Leader authority over all 
branches of the Iranian government, to include the military and the state-run media. The 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formed after the 1979 revolution to 
8 Ibid., 27, 35. 
9 Moghaddam, online discussion, August 8, 2014. 
10 Gary Sick, “The Carter Administration,” The Iran Primer, accessed June 7, 2014, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/carter-administration-0. 
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protect the Islamic Republic and its Supreme Leader. The IRGC’s top commanders report 
to directly to Ayatollah Khamenei. 
The Supreme Leader and IRGC retain control over Iran’s most lethal weapons 
systems as well as Iran’s economic lifeline—the oil and gas industry—and they act as 
patron to Hezbollah, a Lebanese-based Shia terrorist organization capable of operating 
worldwide. The regime also supports Hamas, a militant Palestinian Sunni organization, in 
their resistance against Israel. Perhaps of most concern to the United States and Israel, 
however, is the widely held belief that Iran—through its uranium enrichment program—
may be close to developing a nuclear weapon, which would significantly change the 
balance of power in the Middle East. Khamenei and the ruling clergy in Iran, for the most 
part, continue to perceive the United States and Israel as enemies, oppressors, and direct 
threats to the tenets of the Islamic Republic. 
Iran, formerly known as Persia, is home to almost 80 million people. The majority 
of Iranians identify with a strong sense of Persian nationalism, history, and culture. 
Knowing contemporary Iran, however, requires a thorough understanding of Shia 
Islam—particularly the Twelver branch—and the context surrounding Iranian history and 
current events dating back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.   
Twelver Shi’ism, also known as Twelvers, is the sect of Shia Islam practiced by 
Iran’s Supreme Leader and the majority of Iran’s Muslims.11  Twelvers believe in a line 
of 12 Imams who are the divinely ordained political and religious leaders of Islam and 
direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed.12 The twelfth imam, Mohammed al-
Mahdi, went into occultation in 873 CE as a child. Twelvers believe that the Mahdi will 
return to redeem Islam by defeating its enemies and rule the world under Islamic law. In 
essence, the Iran’s Supreme Leader considers himself a placeholder for the return of the 
Mahdi and, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, can exercise “the missing Imam’s 
authority on Earth.”13 
11 Momen, An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism, xi, xiii. 
12 Sadjadpour, “The Supreme Leader.” 
13 Ibid. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What sacred carriers and religious tools could the Iranian regime use to mobilize 
or launch attacks against United States interests at home or abroad?  This exploratory 
study will contribute, through rigorous research, to the understanding of an emerging 
phenomenon—a thorough analysis of Twelver Shia Islam’s sacred carriers, religious 
tools, and end-times beliefs that could prompt or justify hostile Iranian action against the 
United States. This research does not try to predict whether Iran would act upon its 
religious beliefs or the specific actions it might employ. Rather, it examines the religious 
options—the sacred carriers and tools—that could play a key role in future Iranian 
aggression directed at the United States. 
D. METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research methodology utilized in this thesis follows a qualitative grounded 
theory approach. Rather than beginning with a hypothesis, this project begins with a 
narrowed topic and a research question. Then, using a systematic process to gather, 
process, and analyze data, the goal is to advance a theory, a framework, or a conceptual 
analysis based on careful examination of emerging patterns and concepts. According to 
Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin in their book Basics of Qualitative Research: 
Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, “theory derived from data 
is more likely to resemble the ‘reality’ than is theory derived by putting together a series 
of concepts based on experience or solely through speculation (how one thinks things 
ought to work).”14   
This study, therefore, applies an inductive reasoning approach to large amounts of 
data—mostly primary sources relating to Iran’s religious beliefs. According to Strauss 
and Corbin, grounded theories are drawn from data that “are likely to offer insight, 
14 Anselm L. Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing 
Grounded Theory, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), 12. 
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enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful guide to action.”15  The following 
qualitative, grounded theory methods are used to accomplish this research objective.16 
1. Research Steps 
Step 1:  Capture and analyze data using open coding. Open coding is “the analytic 
process through which concepts are identified and their properties and dimensions are 
discovered in data.”17  Data are broken down and coded, or systematically classified as 
phenomena, ideas, or themes that ultimately emerge into categories. As open coding 
occurs, analytic memos, or notes are written that describe concepts—the building blocks 
of theory.18   
In this research, open coding begins by examining data collected specifically from 
the doctrine and history of Twelver Shia Islam—the brand practiced by the Supreme 
Leader and the most influential leaders inside Iran. Primary sources consist of the Quran, 
and speeches from key leaders to include their social media feeds, websites, and religious 
rulings. Official government statements and The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran are also coded. Secondary sources—derived from expert analysis, press reports, and 
academic literature—are also collected and analyzed for context and insight.   
Step 2:  Categorize the data as themes and concepts emerge from the open coding 
process. Organizing the data into categories or phenomena refines the collection process, 
allowing for a more focused, selective coding process. At this stage, the research question 
and analytic focus can also be refined if needed, and data collection and analysis 
continues.   The goal is to reach a point of “theoretical saturation” where, according to 
Strauss and Corbin, “no new properties, dimensions, or relationships emerge during 
analysis.”19  
15 Ibid. 
16 The captions for steps 1–5 are adapted from an online lecture by Lauren Wollman, “Qualitative 
Research” (online lecture, Center for Homeland Security and Defense, Naval Postgraduate School, n.d.). 
https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/research/lectures/research_qualitative_methods/data/downloads/chds%20a
rticulate%20notes-qualitative%20research.pdf 
17 Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research, 101. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 143. 
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Step 3:  Identify patterns and connections within categories. This step also can be 
described as axial coding as “coding occurs around the axis of a category, linking 
categories at the level of properties and dimensions.”20  The objective of step three is to 
identify relationships, concepts, or patterns within categories that could lead to the 
development of a theory.  
Step 4:  Develop a theoretical interpretation by integrating and interpreting 
patterns and connections within categories. The end state of step four presents a theory 
based on an analysis of the findings. The relevance of the findings should be explained in 
the context of the research project, and they must ultimately support the project’s final 
conclusions.21   
2. Coding Methodology 
The process of capturing, coding and analyzing data was accomplished using 
Evernote. Evernote is a multifaceted mobile, web and computer-based commercial 
(software) tool used by many to capture, save, sync, and organize information. Evernote’s 
document photo feature and web clipping tool were used extensively to take photos of 
specific paragraphs or pages within books, or to clip relevant articles or speeches from 
online sources.   
Once captured within Evernote, the information was analyzed—usually with 
written notes—marked up as needed, and then coded by applying a descriptive tag to the 
research note. The coded or tagged notes were organized in Evernote folders, categorized 
by primary or secondary sources, and further delineated by author or source. As themes 
and concepts emerged from the open coding process, an additional Evernote “working” 
document captured ideas for potential categories, with references back to the original 
source notes. The potential categories were then examined for patterns and connections 
and then grouped in to a final set of related categories or themes.  
20 Ibid., 123. 
21 Wollman, “Qualitative Research” (Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate 
School, n.d.), slide 19. 
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E. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s president from 1989–1997 purportedly told a foreign 
visitor, “If you want to want to know us, become a Shia first.”22  It is difficult for the 
Western observer—whose religious and political paradigm arises from a separation 
between church and state—to understand a nation-state and culture that, through the 
revolution and power monopoly by the religious radicals, has come to be ruled by a 
religious class.23  
It is critical for Western scholars, government analysts, and policymakers, 
therefore, to understand the religious doctrine, the narratives, the sacred carriers and 
religious tools the Islamic Republic of Iran might use to justify action against the United 
States. The significance to the field, then, is to provide a conceptual framework of 
religious markers or triggers that will contribute to a greater understanding of religious-
based threats and/or rhetoric emanating from Iran.  
F. PARAMETERS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This study employs a purposeful sampling strategy that examines the most 
influential individuals and organizations within the Islamic Republic of Iran—those who 
hold or influence the ultimate decision-making power within the regime. For example, 
the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, and leaders of the Revolutionary Guard make 
strategic decisions and hold the reins of power; however, since 1989—when the prime 
minister position was eliminated through a constitutional revision—Iran’s presidents 
have sustained large followings and, as a result, have considerable influence within the 
regime. For the purposes of this study, only the leaders and organizations that currently 
hold, or have held, power within the Islamic Republic of Iran are analyzed. 
While Chapters III and IV offer a brief, but essential, historical and present-day 
context for the reader, this thesis does not explore Iran’s contemporary political 
movements. It also does not dive deeply into issues surrounding Iran’s enrichment of 
22 Hooman Majd, The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2009), 18. 
23 Moghaddam, online discussion, August 8, 2014. 
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uranium for the potential development of a nuclear weapon. From a historical standpoint, 
this thesis mostly analyzes the historical context and documents surrounding the 1979 
Islamic Revolution to present. It does, however, bring to the forefront significant 
historical events and political issues that have significantly shaped Iran and Shia Islam, 
from the formation of Islam to the current day.     
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
1. Chapter II—Literature Review 
The literature review is an essay about the literature examined as part of this 
study.   Most of the literature supporting this thesis falls within three major categories:  1) 
doctrinal and historical research on Iranian Twelver Shia Islam, 2) expository writings 
about Iranian millenarianism and Twelver Shia narratives, and 3) primary and secondary 
sources covering Iran’s current political, religious, and military affairs.   
2. Chapter III—History and Context 
The history and context chapter provides a background of Iran’s recent history, 
and important elements of Shia Islamic doctrine that are most relevant to this research. 
The significance of the martyrdom of Husayn, the origins of Shia Islam, as well as the 
belief in the occultation of the Twelfth Imam will also be discussed as a lead to 
Khomeinism and a discussion about the current regime.   
3. Chapter IV—The Current Regime 
The current regime chapter discusses the formal and informal roles and functions 
of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, as well as the importance and missions 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Chapter IV also discusses the office of the 
presidency, and briefly examines other contemporary issues germane to the research 
question—such as internal affairs and the nuclear enrichment dilemma, and how Iran’s 
oil and gas reserves impact the regime.     
4. Chapter V—Findings  
This chapter presents the findings discovered after applying the grounded theory 
method to the most relevant data samples (see method and research design above). It 
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discusses the relevant categories found during the coding process and then connects them 
into three all-encompassing themes, or religious narratives that serve as the context for 
the analysis. The collection of narratives presented in this chapter, therefore, becomes the 
religious frameworks for Iranian aggression. They are the backdrops, or context, to the 
sacred carriers and tools—the enabling factors the Iranian regime could use to attack the 
United States or its interests.      
5. Chapter VI—Analysis  
The analysis chapter begins by introducing and examining Iran’s most prominent 
sacred carriers and religious tools. The core of this chapter discusses how the Iranian 
regime might use the carriers and tools—against the backdrop of narratives from Chapter 
V—to mobilize or launch attacks against U.S. interests at home or abroad. This chapter 
presents three assessments that examine Iran’s sacred carriers and religious tools through 
the paradigms of past, present, and future scenarios. These three scenarios pull the 
findings and analysis together into examples that are relevant to U.S. national security 
interests.  
6. Chapter VI—Conclusion 
The final chapter discusses project conclusions and final observations. It 
recommends the Cynefin framework—an analytical decision-making framework—as a 
model for U.S. policymakers and analysts to understand Iran’s complex theocratic regime 
and then respond accordingly. The final section provides recommendations for further 
research, lists additional research questions, and gives interested scholars possible next 
steps to examine this topic in greater detail.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While a great deal of literature was analyzed as part of this review, there were 
very few scholarly documents that specifically addressed this project’s research question. 
Notably, there is a large genre of Christian apocalyptic literature that addresses Islam’s 
role in Christian end-times beliefs. Some conclusions from Christian writers attempt to 
partially address this project’s research question; however, their findings (although cited 
and documented) are generally biased and are not used as sources in this thesis.  
Most of the literature pertaining to this research is therefore complementary, and 
falls within three major categories:  1) doctrinal and historical research on Iranian 
Twelver Shia Islam, 2) expository writings about Iranian millenarianism and Twelver 
Shia narratives, and 3) primary and secondary sources covering Iran’s current political, 
religious, and military affairs. The following paragraphs survey the literature within these 
three categories. 
A. DOCTRINAL AND HISTORICAL LITERATURE 
For the purposes of this essay and the research at hand, the history of Twelver 
Shia Islam dates back to 873 CE with the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, Mohammad 
al-Mahdi, “the guided one,” who is often referred to as the Hidden Imam.24  In 1985, 
Moojan Momen wrote a very detailed historical and doctrinal introduction to Twelver 
Shia Islam. The book, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrines of 
Twelver Shi’ism, introduces the reader to modern critical research on Shia Islam as well 
as traditional accounts of Shia history—in particular, how Shias see themselves and the 
passions that mark their commemorations.25  Momen devotes a chapter to the Twelfth 
Imam, “his occultation and return,” and he discusses the doctrinal Shia jurisprudence, 
religious hierarchy, and the different schools within Twelver Shi’ism. Although the book 
was written in 1985, its 363 pages constitute the most thoroughly researched doctrinal 
24 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, Kindle Locations 738–
740. 
25 Momen, An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism, xiv. 
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and historical account of Twelver Shi’ism in this review, and probably within the 
historical scholarship of Shia Islam.  
Dr. Abdulaziz Sachedina, professor or Religious Studies at the University of 
Virginia, has written several works on Islamic messianism. His book on the same topic 
focuses on Twelver Shia messianic doctrine. One of Dr. Sachedina’s motives for writing 
the book, published in 1980, was to examine the literature and make his findings 
available to other scholars.26  Dr. Sachedina credits his success in interpreting religious 
Shia messianic writings to his sources in Mashhad, Iran and Najaf, Iraq.27  This work, 
while dated, seems to be a very balanced academic survey of Twelver Shia messianic 
literature. Dr. Sachedina’s review and scholarly commentary on Twelver Shia doctrine 
complements Momen’s work by providing another resource with which to compare 
religious doctrine.  
Shaykh Muhammad Kabbani, a Sunni scholar and chairman of the Islamic 
Supreme Council of America, brings a Sunni perspective of the Mahdi to the body of 
literature. Although the traditions of a “Mahdi,” or an Islamic messiah, differ in origin 
and concept between the Sunni and the Shia, Kabbani goes to the most original source 
accepted by both branches of Islam—the Prophet Mohammed. In his book The Approach 
of Armageddon: An Islamic Perspective, Shaykh Kabbani references the widely accepted 
Sahih hadith (sayings or traditions of the prophet).  
B. EXPOSITORY WORKS 
A preliminary review of contemporary essays and books on Iranian 
millenarianism and Twelver Shia narratives uncovered promising results. For example, 
the book Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest, written by Dr. Hamid Dabashi, a renowned 
Iranian-American professor of Iranian Studies at Columbia University, is perhaps the 
deepest, most analytical of all the expository writings. Written in 2011, Dabashi 
expounds on the doctrinal and historical, the contemporary, and the ritualistic aspects of 
26 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, ix. 
27 Ibid. 
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Shi’ism that make it what it is today—”a religion of protest.”28  Dabashi explains: “at the 
heart of Shi’ism remains the trauma of a denial—that Ali was denied his right to succeed 
the Prophet as his divinely ordained deputy; and a trauma of betrayal—that Hossein 
[grandson of the Prophet Mohammed] was invited… to reclaim his murdered father’s 
right but was left to be murdered along with a handful of his closest comrades.”29  The 
above themes, analyzed by Dabashi, constitute some of the most important religious 
narratives outlined in future chapters. 
Two relatively recent articles in the journal Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 
bring to light current messianic rumblings in Iran and the larger Shia Crescent.30  Dr. 
Bernd Kaussler, associate professor of political science at James Madison University, 
writes in his 2012 article, “Is The End Nigh for the Islamic Republic?,” about a recent 
“country-wide resurgence in messianic activity and rhetoric.”31  The second notable 
journal article, “Messianism in the Shiite Crescent,” written by David Cook, associate 
professor of Religious Studies at Rice University, examines the signs and doctrines of the 
Mahdi’s reappearance and how these beliefs are, or are not, emerging in the present-day 
Shiite Crescent.  
Another author, Abbas Amanat, should be mentioned as one of the leading 
contemporary scholars on Shi’a millenarianism. Dr. Amanat, a professor of history at 
Yale University, published Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism in 2009. An 
endorsement on the inside cover claims that Amanat’s research “will set the agenda for 
future scholarship in this area.”32  Amanat examines many different angles of messianic 
aspirations in contemporary Iran—mostly in his final chapter. Of note is his cultural 
analysis of the Iranian youth’s interest in miracle messianic cults and congregational 
28 Hamid Dabashi, Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 
83. 
29 Ibid., 23. 
30 The Shia Crescent is made up of the Middle Eastern countries where most of the Shia Muslims 
reside. When observed on a map the countries—Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon—form a crescent 
shape.   
31 Bernd Kaussler, “Is The End Nigh for the Islamic Republic?,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 
Hudson Institute 13 (July 27, 2012): 71. 
32 Abbas Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009). 
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prayers “hastening the return of the Hidden Imam.”33  A more thorough look at Amanat’s 
writings will likely shed light on the cultural aspects of Iranian millenarianism—a factor 
that should not be overlooked as part of this research.  
C. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES 
1. Primary Sources 
The book Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, 
translated and annotated by Hamid Algar in 1981, is this project’s leading primary source 
for analyzing Ayatollah Khomeini’s major works before, during, and immediately 
following the 1979 revolution. The most important of Khomeini’s works—essentially the 
foundational document for the 1979 Islamic Republic of Iran—is his treatise titled 
Islamic Government. In this book, Khomeini presents his case and evidence for 
instituting an Islamic government on Earth.   
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, adopted on October 24, 1979, 
and amended in July 1989, establishes an Islamic form of government based on belief in 
“one God” and “the exclusive attribution of sovereignty and the legislation of law to 
Him, and the necessity of surrender to His commands.”34 As a primary source, and of 
paramount importance to this thesis, Iran’s constitution provides a real-world example of 
how Iran integrates Shia Islam into its current government. 
Moving to the regime’s current leadership, the literature survey mostly includes 
primary sources from Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the primary decision-maker 
in Iran and the one most likely to influence Iran’s posture toward peace or aggression. 
There is a rich selection of primary and secondary sources that expound on Khamenei’s 
viewpoints relevant to this project’s research question. The literature describing 
Khamenei’s views comes in several forms:  primary sources from the Khamenei and 
Iranian government websites (which one can assume is propaganda), and secondary, 
state-run media reports quoting Khamenei (which one can assume are biased). 
33 Ibid., 226. 
34 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
Iranian Studies 47, no. 1 (September 27, 2013): 166. 
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Khamenei’s website, The Office of the Supreme Leader: Sayyid Ali Khamenei, 
for example, contains English translations of his speeches, a library of Islamic laws, as 
well as a page of frequently asked questions.35  The website functions as a well-
organized library containing the Supreme Leader’s current and archived speeches, 
messages and letters, teachings, and viewpoints on numerous topics—to include his end-
times beliefs with regard to the Mahdi. In addition to his English website, Khamenei also 
uses social media to shape the narrative he wishes to portray about Iran. As of June 2014, 
Khamenei’s English Twitter account (@khamenei_ir) claims more than 57,000 followers. 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sixth president of Iran and former mayor of Tehran, 
is well known for his uniquely bold and religiously themed speeches at the annual United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Ahmadinejad’s UNGA speeches and many of his 
writings and interviews are available as primary sources. Additionally, the primary 
sources for his successor, Hassan Rouhani, include speeches and quotes from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s Presidency—English website. Hassan Rouhani also has an official 
Twitter account (@HassanRouhani). 
2. Secondary Sources 
In order to understand the contextual narratives and events leading to the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, one must understand the regime prior to the revolution. This is where 
Dr. Abbas Milani’s contemporary book, The Shah, helps one comprehend, as objectively 
as possible, the king of Iran and the hostile environment before the revolution. Abbas 
Milani, director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, wrote this 2012 biography of 
Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlevi, because, as he states, “a new look at the Shah’s life, free 
from the excesses of his overzealous defenders and detractors, is now not only possible 
but more than ever necessary.”36  
One of the most useful and oft-cited textbooks on Iran is The Iran Primer, 
sponsored by the United States Institute for Peace and edited by Robin Wright. The book 
35 Ali Khamenei, “The Office of the Supreme Leader, Sayyid Ali Khamenei,” accessed October 6, 
2013, http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/. 
36 Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), Kindle Locations 85–86. 
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is in print, but its articles are also compiled on the “The Iran Primer” website. The site 
states that as “the world’s most comprehensive website on Iran, ‘The Primer’ brings 
together 50 experts—Western and Iranian—in concise chapters on politics, economy, 
military, foreign policy, and the nuclear program. It chronicles events under six U.S. 
presidents. It also has leader bios, timelines, data on nuclear sites, and context for what 
lies ahead.”  For example, one of the writers for The Iran Primer, Karim Sadjadpour, an 
Iran expert and senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
provides a concise yet thorough essay about Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Dr. Abbas 
Milani, also writes a “Primer” article about Iran’s Green Movement.  
Mehdi Khalaji, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
and a Qom-trained Shiite theologian, writes a very timely 2014 article titled, “Tightening 
the Reins: How Khamenei Makes Decisions.”  Khalaji’s insight is especially important 
given that he was trained in Qom—one of Iran’s holiest cities and a location where 
clerics are trained in the many Shia seminaries. Khalaji’s article presents a thorough look 
at how Khamenei balances power between the country’s many factions and religious 
elites, and most importantly, why after 25 years as Supreme Leader, Khamenei has 
gradually seized and maintains most of the power in Iran.  
While the Supreme Leader is the most powerful leader in Iran, there are other 
leaders, councils, and organizations within Iran that yield considerable influence. The 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), for example, was formed after the 1979 
revolution to protect the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader.37 The IRGC’s top 
commanders control many facets of Iran’s political, commercial, and military apparatus.  
A 2014 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment on Iran provides an exhaustive 
analysis on the various branches of the IRGC to include the Revolutionary Guard’s elite 
Qods Force and the Basij Militia. The Jane’s Iran country assessment, in fact, addresses 
all facets of the Islamic Republic’s government, military, and political structure. 
Additionally, a September 2013 report from the Center for a New American Security 
(CNAS) titled, “Pushback: Countering the Iran Action Network,” elaborates further on 
37 Alireza Nader, “The Revolutionary Guards,” The Iran Primer, accessed October 6, 2013, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards. 
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the nature and mission of the IRGC Qods Force, Hezbollah, and the Iranian Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security (MOIS).   
In 2010, the Rand Corporation under a contract with the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, published Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads38: An Exploration of Iranian 
Leadership Dynamics. The book’s objective is to provide a “framework to help 
policymakers and analysts better understand existing and evolving leadership dynamics 
driving Iranian decisionmaking.”39  One of the primary conclusions in this book, as well 
as many other scholarly reports, is that Iran’s governing process relies on key 
personalities and factions within informal networks to get business done. The Rand book, 
therefore, dedicates one full chapter to understanding the complexity of Iran’s 
factionalism and informal networks.   
In June 2013, Hassan Rouhani succeeded Ahmadinejad as Iran’s new president. 
Many in the United States are wondering, and speculating, how Iran might change under 
new presidential leadership. A survey of current writings yielded many well thought 
essays from Iran experts. One such expert is Suzanne Maloney from the Brookings 
Institution. Her Foreign Affairs magazine article on “Why Rouhani Won—And Why 
Khamenei Let Him” is a thoughtful analysis of Rouhani’s political, military, and religious 
background and, of course, why the Supreme Leader allowed his election.   
Two scholarly books in particular provide a general but useful perspective of 
Shi’ism in Iran and in the Middle East region. Vali Nasr’s book, The Shia Revival: How 
Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, provides a thorough analysis of the current 
Shia revival within Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. Nasr’s work is well regarded by academic 
scholars and is a valuable resource in understanding Iran’s influence amongst the Shia 
throughout the Middle East. The other book, by Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the 
Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs, underscores a religious, but 
38 David E. Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership 
Dynamics (Santa Monica, CA:RAND, 2010), 25. Bonyads are foundations “which function as independent 
economic entities and patronage networks unaccountable to the state.” The Supreme Leader appoints the 
bonyad directors. 
39  Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, Preface. 
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more pragmatic side of Iran and how the power struggles play out in “the age of the 
Ayatollahs.” 
Finally, Dr. Fathali M. Moghaddam, a professor of psychology and director of the 
Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University, has written several books that 
help in understanding a complex Iranian regime from a global and psychological 
perspective. For example, his book The Psychology of Dictatorship presents a 
contemporary model whereby one can examine the ideology of Iran’s theocratic 
dictatorship, and the psychological processes behind it. Moghaddam discusses the 
importance of sacred carriers, and how the Iranian regime will, using religion, justify its 
actions to maintain control.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The principal strength of the literature reviewed in this project is the numerous 
historical, doctrinal, and scholarly works that examine the complexities of Shia Islam 
from many viewpoints. For the purposes of this study, however, the primary gap or 
weakness is that most of the literature does not specifically address proposed research 
question:  What sacred carriers and religious tools could the Iranian regime use to 
mobilize or launch attacks against United States interests at home or abroad?   
This review highlighted several scholarly works that begin to answer the above 
question; however, an analysis of the primary and secondary sources encompassing 
Iranian current affairs will always be the most important and perhaps the most difficult to 
interpret. Primary sources such as Khamenei’s speeches or reports will be controlled. 
And secondary sources that expound on what is happening in Iran may be biased or 
agenda-driven. Going forward, then, the research goal is to present the foundational Shia 
doctrine in the next chapter by briefly looking at Iran’s history and context, and in 
following chapters, to synthesize the literature and apply a research methodology to 
analyze the words and actions of Iran’s most influential leaders and organizations. 
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III. HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
To fully understand the current discourse in the Islamic Republic of Iran, one 
must understand its long history, its rich culture, and ultimately, how Shia Islam has 
shaped Iran’s current destiny. While the subject of this chapter merits its own separate 
and much larger study, its scope has been narrowed to focus primarily on the history of 
Shia Islam and the events leading to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This chapter begins 
with the origins of Shia Islam, it reviews Shia messianic doctrine, and then progresses 
through several momentous events before, during, and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 
By understanding the historical and contextual frames highlighted in this chapter, the 
reader will be able to successfully navigate through the remainder of this thesis. 
A. TWELVER SHIA ISLAM AND THE MARTYRDOM OF HUSAYN 
Following the Islamic Prophet Mohammed’s death in 632 CE, the succession of 
leadership fell to one of Mohammed’s closest companions and father-in-law, Abu Bakr.40  
While Abu Bakr was generally recognized as the first Caliph—leader of the Muslim 
community (umma)—many of the prophet’s companions believed the line of succession 
should have stayed within the prophet’s bloodline family.41 According to a prominent 
Hadith,42 Mohammed delivered a final sermon in 632 where he declared, according to the 
Shia account, that his son-in-law and cousin, Ali ibn Abi Taleb, should be his successor.  
Thus, listen, obey, and submit to the command of your Lord, for Allah, the 
mighty and the majestic, is your master (Mawla), then [His Messenger], 
Muhammad, who is now addressing you, is your master. Then, after me, 
Ali is your master (Wali) and your leader (Imam) by the command of 
Allah, your Lord. Then, leadership shall be in my progeny, within his 
offspring, until the Day you meet Allah and His Messenger.43 
40 Momen, An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam, 10. 
41 Ibid., 20–22. 
42 “In Islam, Hadith refers to that which is attributed to the Prophet [Mohammed]… as words, actions 
or approvals, physical features and characteristics.”  (Source:  http://www.islamic-
dictionary.com/index.php?word=hadith) 
43 “The Last Sermon of Muhammad,” Wikisource, accessed April 20, 2014, 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Last_Sermon_of_Muhammad_by_Shia_Accounts. 
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The Shia version of the Hadith proclaims not only that Ali should be 
Mohammed’s heir, but also that the future leadership of Islam—referred to as the 
Imamate in Shia Islam—would flow through Mohammed’s progeny. While this Hadith is 
phrased and interpreted differently by Sunni Muslims, the belief that Ali was the first 
rightful heir to the Prophet Mohammed, and thus the first imam, is a foundational Shia 
belief; it is at this point of doctrine where Shia Islam splits with the more mainstream 
Sunni branch.44 The map in Figure 1 shows Shiites as a percentage of the Muslim 
population in the Middle East. At present, approximately 90% of the Muslim population 
worldwide belongs to the Sunni branch.45   
 
Figure 1.  Shiites as a Percentage of the Middle East Muslim Population.46 
44 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 5–6. 
45 Joseph Liu, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public 
Life Project, October 7, 2009, http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-
population/. 
46 Stephen Crittenden, “The Clash Within Civilisations: How The Sunni-Shiite Divide Cleaves The 
Middle East,” The Global Mail, August 22, 2012, http://static.theglobalmail.org/feature/the-clash-within-
civilisations-how-the-sunni-shiite-divide-cleaves-the-middle-east/349/. 
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1. The Battle of Karbala and Martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali 
The foundations of Shia Islam and its contemporary manifestations are deeply 
rooted in one particular event—the Battle of Karbala (in present-day Iraq) and the 
Martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali (son of Ali), the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson.47  Ali 
was eventually appointed as the fourth caliph; however, following his death, Ali’s eldest 
son, Hasan, abdicated the caliphate to the Umayyad leader, Mu’awiya, as a compromise 
for peace.48  The Shia followers of Ali, however, maintained that Husayn, Ali’s youngest 
and only remaining son, was the rightful heir and divinely mandated leader of Islam.49  
Husayn would not give his oath of allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph and 
successor to Mu’awiya, prompting the caliph to send an army to confront Husayn and his 
followers. The thousand-strong Umayyad army met Husayn and 72 of his companions 
during the Muslim holy month of Muharram in what is now present day Karbala, Iraq.50 
According to Shia tradition, Husayn and his band fought valiantly, knowing they would 
sacrifice their lives for their cause. Husayn and his entire band were slaughtered and 
beheaded on the 10th day of Muharram in 680 CE. In both the Sunni and Shia traditions, 
Husayn and his companions are considered martyrs. In the Shia tradition, however, 
Husayn’s martyrdom is commemorated annually on the Day of Ashura—the 10th day of 
Muharram in the Muslim calendar. 
Martyrdom is a recurring theme in Shia Islam. Husayn and 72 of his companions 
became the ultimate example of sacrifice; the number 72 in the Shia tradition symbolizes 
martyrdom.51  In his book The Shia Revival, Vali Nasr explains:  “Shias believe that 
martyrdom is the highest testament to faith, following the example of the imams, a deed 
that will gain the martyr entry into paradise just as it will strengthen Shiism.”52  
47 Momen, An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam, 33. 
48 Ibid., 27. 
49 Ibid., 28. 
50 Ibid., 30–31. 
51 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, Kindle Location 367. 
52 Ibid., Kindle Locations 611–613. 
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Martyrdom, then, also becomes important in the Iranian tradition—an important theme 
that will be highlighted throughout this thesis.  
2. The Day of Ashura 
For devout Shia Muslims, the first 10 days of Muharram and especially the tenth 
day, Ashura, is a time for deep internal reflection and mourning for Husayn. In many 
Shia communities, the Day of Ashura is marked by a processional of men marching down 
streets, self-flagellating with chains, and chanting “Ya Husayn” to the beat of drums. In 
the community mosque, the sheikh narrates the story of the Battle of Karbala—allowing 
his followers to hear and feel the tragedy of Husayn’s unjust martyrdom, and to reiterate 
the doctrine that Ali and Husayn were Mohammed’s divinely appointed heirs.   
The Day of Ashura is not only a time to mourn the martyrdom of Husayn but also 
a time to reflect upon the injustices, sufferings, and oppression the Shia have endured 
since the Battle of Karbala to the present day. In his book Islamic Messianism, Dr. 
Abdulaziz Sachedina describes Ashura as occupying a “significant position in Shi’i 
history as well as in its piety. The martyrdom of al-Husayn on this day… stands as a 
climax of Shi’i suffering and passion. As a result, the day generates more than anything 
else a belief in the redemption of the umma [Muslim community] through the sufferings 
of the son of ‘Ali and Fatima.”53 
The annual commemoration of Ashura and its themes of martyrdom, victimhood, 
suffering and injustice have a multitude of modern-day applications for the Shia in Iran. 
During the 1979 Islamic revolution, for example, Khomeini effectively used the notions 
of injustice and suffering against tyranny and worldly oppression to mobilize the masses 
for revolutionary political ends.54  Not long after the revolution, Khomeini called upon 
the Iranian youth to perform the ultimate sacrifice of martyrdom during the Iran–Iraq 
War, which will be discussed in more detail in Section D of this chapter. 
53 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 157. 
54 Kaussler, “Is The End Nigh for the Islamic Republic?,” 71. 
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3. The Imamate—Succession of Imams in Twelver Shia Islam 
The Twelver Shi’ite Imamate, or Imamah, consists of the line of leaders, all 
descendants of Mohammed, beginning with Ali as the first imam, to the twelfth imam, 
Mohammed ibn al-Hasan, also known as Mohammed al-Mahdi.55 Unlike Sunni Islam, 
the Shia recognize these imams as divinely appointed representatives of Allah, who like 
the Prophet Mohammed, are given spiritual authority through the line of Ali and his wife 
Fatima, the prophet’s daughter.56 After the death of Ali, each imam was successively 
martyred until the Twelfth Imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi, who went into hiding as a child 
in 873 CE to protect his life.57   
Dr. Hamid Dabashi, a renowned Iranian-American professor of Iranian Studies at 
Columbia University, summarized the importance of the Shia Imamah in his book 
“Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest”:   
Islam, for the Shi’is, is in effect incomplete; the cycle of Nubuwwah 
[Prophethood] is historically interrupted if it is not carried forward in the 
institution of the Imamah. Considering that practically all Shi’i imams, 
with the exception of the twelfth who is hidden and in occultation, are 
commonly and doctrinally believed to have been martyred, killed in their 
youth by their adversaries, shahadat [martyrdom] becomes constitutional 
to the Shi’ite ideal of heroism.58   
Another significant implication from the Shia doctrine of the Imamate is the hope 
and expectation that through Ali’s line, the rightful Imams, “could and would rule with 
true guidance from a purified Islam.”59  In other words, the Shia believe that it is only 
through a descendant of Ali and Fatima, that Islamic justice will be delivered to the world 
before the end of time.60   
55 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 8–9. 
56 Ibid., 17–18. 
57 Ibid., 8. 
58 Dabashi, Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest, 85. 
59 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 7. 
60 Ibid., 17. 
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B. THE OCCULTATION AND ROLE OF THE HIDDEN IMAM 
Twelver Shias believe that the Twelfth Imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi (the Mahdi), 
went into occultation in 873 CE as a five-year-old child to protect his life. They also believe 
that he is the permanent imam and “Lord of the Age,” who will reappear and redeem Islam 
and bring justice to the world before the Day of Judgment.61  The term occultation in Shia 
tradition means that the Mahdi is not dead, but miraculously preserved and hidden from the 
world until Allah initiates his reappearance. According to Sachedina, “the role assigned to al-
Mahdi…at the end of human history, is the fulfillment of the mission of all these great 
prophets [the Imamate]. He is the victorious Imam who will restore the purity of the Faith, 
which will bring true and uncorrupted guidance to all mankind.”62    
Traditional Shia accounts portray the Mahdi returning as a “vengeful figure who 
will first take vengeance upon those Sunni Muslims who have opposed the rights of the 
family of the Prophet Muhammad to rule and who will then establish a messianic state 
that will encompass the world.”63  David Cook, an associate professor of Religious 
Studies at Rice University, writes:  
The classical sources are unclear about whether or not the Mahdi will 
convert humankind to Islam. What the sources do make clear is that the 
Mahdi will be especially ruthless toward existing Islamic religious 
establishments:  he will destroy mosques because they have become over-
adorned and not true places of worship, and he will kill the ulama, or 
religious scholars, because they have failed to establish a just and properly 
Islamic order. In every way, the appearance of the Mahdi will cause a 
sharp and total break with existing Islamic norms.64 
Abbas Amanat, a professor of history at Yale University and one of the leading 
contemporary scholars on Shi’a millenarianism explains that in Shia traditions, “the 
Mahdi’s revenge of Husayn’s blood will initiate an apocalyptic battle of cosmic 
61 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, Kindle Location 728. 
62 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 182. 




                                                 
proportion that precedes the Day of Resurrection and the End of Time.”65  Sachedina 
contrasts the appearance of the Mahdi with the messianic beliefs of Jews and Christians:  
The Christians think of a Second Coming, the Jews of one who is yet to 
come, while the Muslims conceive of a person who will ‘appear’ (zuhur) 
or “rise” (qiyam) against existing intolerable secular authority. The term 
“messianism” in the Islamic context is frequently used to translate the 
important concept of an eschatological figure, the Mahdi, who as the 
foreordained leader ‘will rise’ to launch a great social transformation in 
order to restore and adjust all things under divine guidance. The Islamic 
messiah, thus, embodies the aspirations of his followers in the restoration 
of the purity of the Faith which will bring true and uncorrupted guidance 
to all mankind, creating a just social order and a world free from 
oppression in which the Islamic revelation will be the norm for all 
nations.66 
Thus, the annual Ashura commemoration focuses on the Shia’s suffering and 
oppression, personified through the unjust martyrdom of Husayn and his family line of 
Imamate successors. The belief in the final imam, the Mahdi, offers hope for the eventual 
rule of complete justice and an end to suffering. There is a strong victimhood theme 
within Shia Islam. As the minority sect within Islam, they feel oppressed by the majority 
Sunni branch.  “This is clearly evident,” as Sachedina points out, “in the condolences that 
the Shi’ites offer each other [during Ashura]: ‘May God grant us great rewards for our 
bereavement caused by the martyrdom of al-Husayn…and make us among those who 
will exact vengeance for his blood with His friend (wali) the Imam al-Mahdi.”67  It is not 
a coincidence, then, that most Shia sources cite the Day of Ashura, the 10th of 
Muharram, as the day when the Mahdi will appear.68  The doctrine of Mahdism—the 
belief in an “Islamic messiah”—therefore, is a powerful concept and a bedrock 
foundation for Twelver Shi’ism in Iran.   
By contrast, Sunni Muslims also believe in the Mahdi as an end-times messiah 
figure, although not under the same conditions and context as the Twelver Shia Muslims. 
65 Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism, Preface, viii. 
66 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 2. 
67 Ibid., 158. 
68 Ibid., 157. 
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Sunni Muslims, for example, do not believe the Mahdi to be the “Twelfth Imam” in the 
line of direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. However, the Sunni tradition of the 
Mahdi does exhibit some parallels to Twelver Shi’ism. Shaykh Muhammad Kabbani, a 
Sunni scholar and Chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America, explains that 
the coming of the Mahdi is “confirmed by many authentic narrations (hadith)” of the 
Prophet Mohammed and that his arrival “must occur before Judgment Day.”69  In his 
book The Approach of Armageddon: An Islamic Perspective, Shaykh Kabbani references 
the widely accepted Sahih hadith from which he quotes the prophet Mohammed:  “If this 
world has just one day remaining Allah will extend that day until a man comes. He is 
from me, (or from my family). His name is like my name, (i.e., Muhhamad)…He fills the 
earth with equality and justice, as it has been filled with injustice and oppression.”70 
C. KHOMEINISM, THE REVOLUTION, AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
Because the Shia split doctrinally with Sunnis following the death Mohammed, 
(and later Ali) they were despised, persecuted, and murdered by the more powerful Sunni 
caliphates and, in more modern times, by the Sunni and colonial regimes of the Middle 
East. For nearly 200 years, the Shia relied upon their divinely guided line of imams for 
direction and hope. Following the occultation of the Mahdi, the Shia put their faith in the 
ulama, or the Shia clergy, who became the legal and spiritual experts absent the authority 
of the imams—”these scholars and experts in religious law were the forerunners of 
today’s ayatollahs (literally, signs of God).”71  During the occultation, the Mahdi is not 
completely cut off from the Shia community—learned jurists can speak and act on behalf 
of the Imam for religious matters.72  The doctrine of speaking and acting on behalf of the 
Mahdi, therefore, becomes an important tenet of Khomeinism.  
69 Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, The Approach of Armageddon?: An Islamic Perspective: A Chronicle 
of Scientific Breakthroughs and World Events That Occur During the Last Days, as Foretold by Prophet 
Muhammad (Washington, DC: Islamic Supreme Council of America, 2003), 228. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Nasr, The Shia Revival, Kindle Locations 728–731. 
72 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 23. 
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Khomeinism is best described as Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine or theory on the 
establishment of an Islamic state. His theory of the velayat-e faqih (translated as ‘the 
governance of the jurist’) is a re-construction of Shia doctrine positing that “God’s law 
should be enforced by religious scholars, the fuqaha,—those most qualified to interpret 
the law—until the Hidden Imam returned.”73  This differed from the traditional Shia 
governance model, which left the state—not the religious scholars—in charge of the day-
to-day political affairs until the Mahdi returned to establish the perfect Islamic state.74  
Khomeini argued that the Qur’an and the Sunna (the life and teachings of Mohammed) 
“contain all the law and ordinances man needs ‘to attain happiness and perfection of his 
state’, and that the law is ‘actually the ruler’…that God would not have created the law—
the shari’a—had he not wanted to enforce it.”75  In his 1970 compilation titled, Islamic 
Government, Khomeini taught that, “in the time of the Prophet [Mohammed], laws were 
not merely expounded and promulgated; they were also implemented… it is for this 
reason that the formation of a government and the establishment of executive organs are 
necessary. Belief in the necessity for these is part of the general belief in the Imamate, as 
are, too, the exertion and struggle for the sake of establishing them.”76 
1. The Context Surrounding the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
Many events, people, and issues shaped the Iranian environment and narrative 
leading to the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 
Perhaps the most significant pre-revolutionary event that influenced the trajectory of the 
country was precipitated by the United States and Great Britain in 1953. The two 
countries engineered a clandestine coup in 1953 to oust the democratically elected Iranian 
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq. Mossadeq’s policy of nationalizing Iran’s oil 
industry, thereby cutting off profits to the Anglo-Iranian Oil company—a British owned 
corporation—initiated a series of cascading events that led to a worsening relationship 
73 Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (London: IB Tauris, 1999), 153. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini; 
Translated and Annotated by Hamid Algar, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 37. 
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between Iran and Great Britain. British intelligence enlisted the services of the Central 
Intelligence Agency—which was already leery of Iran pivoting toward the Soviet bloc—
and the two agencies unseated Mossadeq and halted Iran’s progress toward democracy.77 
As a result, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi regained sole power as the U.S.-backed 
monarch and steadily pursued a path toward a secular dictatorship. 
By the early 1960s, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shia clergy, and many of the 
commoners became increasingly dissatisfied with the Shah’s decisions—perceived as 
appeasing the U.S. government—and the country’s blatant shift toward Western values 
and culture. Moreover, the Shah’s greed for opulence, funded by Iranian oil and Western 
money, and the brutal methods of the Shah’s secret police, the SAVAK, began to stir up 
the masses and plant the seeds of revolution. On the 10th day of Muharram (the Day of 
Ashura) in 1963, Khomeini delivered a historic speech that warned the Shah “not to 
behave in such a way that the people would rejoice when he should ultimately be forced 
to leave the country.”78  The Shah arrested Khomeini a few days after this speech and, as 
a result, major uprisings ensued throughout Iran to protest Khomeini’s confinement. 
According to Hamid Algar, who translated many of Khomeini’s speeches into English, 
“the date on which this uprising began [June 5, 1963], marked a turning point in the 
modern history of Iran. It established Imam Khomeini as national leader and spokesman 
for popular aspirations…and introduced a period of mass political activity under the 
guidance of religious leadership.”79  Khomeini was eventually released from prison and 
resumed his denunciations of the Shah’s regime. His influence and popularity continued 
to grow to the point that the Shah felt his only option to silence the popular cleric was to 
exile him to Turkey in 1964, and then to Iraq in 1965.80   
Khomeini found refuge in the Shi’ite holy city of Najaf, Iraq, for over a decade, 
where he continued to gain followers and promote his anti-West and Marxist Islamic 
social justice philosophy. Historically, the most important Iraqi centers of Shia Islam are 
77 Milani, The Shah, 152, 161. 
78 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 17. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 17–18. 
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Karbala and Najaf, and the most important Shia clerics lived in these two cities. By 
allowing Khomeini to find refuge in Najaf, the Shah unintentionally helped him become 
more important in the Islamic world.81  (The maps in Figure 2 provide a detailed view of 
the cities in Iraq and Iran).  
Khomeini’s thoughts and teachings from Iraq continued to influence the Iranian 
masses. In September 1978, Saddam Hussein obliged the Shah, by expelling Khomeini from 
Iraq, leaving him to look for another base of operations.82  He settled in Paris, France, a 
month later where, ironically, he had more access to media and a greater ability to publish his 
sermons through cassette tapes and circulars. Khomeini’s influential teachings and 
proclamations were smuggled into Iran and, according to Algar, “his name was constantly 
repeated in the slogans that were devised and chanted in the demonstrations; his portrait 
served as a revolutionary banner; and his return from exile to supervise the installation of an 
Islamic government was insistently demanded.”83  The enormous advantage Khomeini had 
over secular politicians was his access to the network of mosques around Iran. He also had 
financial support, particularly through the Islamic taxes that practicing Shia Muslims paid to 
their “source of emulation” they chose to follow.84 
  
81 Milani, The Shah, 272, 406. 
82 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 20. 
83 Ibid., 19. 
84 Fathali Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), Kindle Locations 1947–1950. 
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Figure 2.  Maps of Iraq and Iran85 
2. The Revolution and Formation of the Islamic Republic 
In 1978, civil unrest against the Shah’s regime—emboldened by Khomeini’s 
sermons—reached a crescendo toward the end of the year. With his government on the 
edge of collapse, the Shah left the country in January 1979, paving the way for Khomeini 
to return home. After spending more than 14 years in exile, Khomeini returned to Tehran 
in February 1979 to a throng of more than a million supporters welcoming his return.86  
A month later, in mid-February 1979, revolutionaries overthrew the remaining 
factions supporting the Shah and opened the door for Khomeini to implement an Islamic 
version of social justice as he had outlined in his books and speeches. Meanwhile, the 
1979 revolution caught the rest of the world off guard. The United States’ strategic ally in 
the region and proxy military stronghold along the Soviet Union’s southwest flank was 
85  “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed July 25, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 
86 Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 22. 
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gone. Gary Sick, President Jimmy Carter’s senior White House Aide on Iran and a 
member of the National Security Council, wrote, “This was the first contact between the 
United States and radical, political Islam. It set the tone for future dealings with Iran and 
other Islamic states.”87 
In a March 1979 referendum, riding the momentous wave of the revolution, 
98.2% of the people of Iran voted to institute an Islamic form of government.88 Dr. 
Abbas Milani has noted that the Shah also had this kind of support for “elections” and 
“referenda” he implemented. For example, 99% endorsed his [the Shah’s] 1963 ‘White 
Revolution’ in a national referendum.89  Elections and referenda in such ‘democratic 
dictatorships’ can be meaningless.90  As Dr. Fathali Moghaddam explains in Psychology 
of Dictatorship, “context creates the springboard, and the availability of the potential 
dictator who takes advantage of the situation to spring to power completes the shift to or 
continues the dictatorship.”91  So it was with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; he 
completed the shift in power through the 1979 Revolution, and then laid the foundation 
for an Islamic government clothed as a republic, but in the end, ruled as a theocratic 
totalitarian regime. 
3. The Iranian Constitution  
In the Name of the Almighty God 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 
Article 1: The government of Iran is an Islamic Republic, which the nation of Iran based 
on its long-held belief in the rule of the truth and the justice of the Qu’ran, and after its 
victorious Islamic revolution, under the leadership of marja’-e taql d the exalted Grand 
Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, has established.92 
 
87 Sick, “The Carter Administration.” 
88 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
162. 
89 Milani, The Shah, 294. 
90 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 31–32. 
91 Ibid., 53. 
92 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
166. 
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In October 1979, the people ratified a new constitution that formally abolished the 
monarchy and permanently enshrined an Islamic system of governance. The Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran codifies the roles, responsibilities, and duties of the 
Supreme Leader, the president of Iran, as well as the judicial and legislative branches. Of 
note is Article 12, which declares, “The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver 
Ja’fari school of [shi’] religion. This principle shall remain eternally unchangeable.”93  
While there are many schools of thought or sects within Shia Islam, this constitution 
specifically declares that Twelver Shi’ism—the belief in a line of 12 divinely appointed 
imams—is the official version of Shia Islam practiced by the state. Perhaps more 
important, however, for those advocating a more secular system in Iran is this 
pronouncement in chapter 14:  
It is impossible to change the content of the articles which concern the 
Islamic nature of the system; establishment of all the laws and regulations 
on the bases of Islamic criteria and the faith and aims of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran; the form of the government as a republic; the 
sovereignty of the command [of God] and religious leadership of the 
community [of believers].94  
The Islamic Republic’s constitution, therefore, carefully cements the relationship 
between Twelver Shia Islam and the state. Short of another revolution and a complete 
transformation to a more secular form of governance, The Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran ensures there will be no separation between church and state. Chapter VI 
offers a more thorough analysis of the Iranian constitution as a primary foundational 
document—a potential legal and religious tool that could propel the Iranian regime to act 
against the United States.   
D. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN RECENT IRANIAN HISTORY 
1. The U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis (1979–1981) 
In October 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter reluctantly admitted the deposed 
Shah to the U.S. for medical treatment—a decision that set off a chain of events that has 
93 Ibid., 169. 
94 Ibid., 200. 
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shaped the U.S.-Iranian relationship to the present day. With the 1953 British and U.S.-
led coup of the Iranian government still fresh in their minds and fearing that the U.S. was 
plotting to overthrow the Islamic revolution, student supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini 
stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and captured 66 
Americans.95 The students demanded the immediate return of the Shah to Iran in 
exchange for the hostages, but the Carter administration denied their demands. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy siege rallied the Iranian public behind Khomeini, helping 
him to ultimately dismiss Iran’s provisional government led by the moderate Prime 
Minister Mehdi Barzargan. With Khomeini and the clerics fully in charge, the new 
regime defiantly held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days, releasing them the day U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981.96   
The U.S. Embassy hostage crisis galvanized Iran’s populace behind the 
revolution, reinforced Khomeini’s power, and helped shape Iran’s foreign policy toward 
the East and the West. According to Ray Takyeh, “the hostage crisis was designed not 
just to disrupt a nonexistent American coup but also to provoke a different international 
orientation. As such, Iran’s foreign policy would not merely be an exemption from the 
superpower conflict but assertion of radical Islamism as the foundation of its approach to 
the world as well.”97  The hostage crisis has been described as the crucial “crisis 
incident” to cement the re-establishment of dictatorship in Iran.98  In the wake of the 
1979 hostage crisis, and the formation of an Islamic government, the U.S. and Iran 
severed official diplomatic relations. As a result, the subsequent relationship between the 
two countries has been marked by more than 30 years of animosity, distrust, and 
misunderstanding. 
95 Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs, 27. 
96 Ibid., 35. 
97 Ibid., 40. 
98 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 111, 115. 
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2. The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) 
In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran on the pretext of reclaiming land in a border 
area long disputed by both countries. Iraq, led by a Sunni but secular Arab government 
under Saddam Hussein, feared that Iran would export its revolution to the Shia in Iraq—
who made up the majority of Iraq’s citizens and who had been suppressed by the Sunni-
led Iraqi government. With support from the United States, Saddam calculated that the 
new Islamic Republic was vulnerable, still in the midst of reorganizing its government 
and military, and that Iraq could overwhelm Iran, overthrow the clerical regime, and gain 
more oil rich land for Iraq. Despite Iraq’s initial victories, the Islamic Republic countered 
with its own tactics—unconventional human wave martyr attacks consisting of young 
men following in the path of Imam Husayn, sacrificing their lives for their brand of Shia 
Islam and for the Islamic Republic. Depicted by the Khomeini regime as a battle between 
“good and evil,” thousands of young men volunteered for martyrdom and became part of 
the “human wave” attacks against the Iraqi Army—using their bodies to detonate land 
mines and assault well-fortified Iraqi gun positions and tanks.99 
The war lasted eight years, during which the human losses tallied to more than a 
million. It was a war between Arabs and Persians, a competition for power and land, but 
from a religious standpoint it was a contest of ideologies between the Sunni and Shia.100  
Ray Takeyh writes:  “The clerics, whose revolution had succeeded against great odds, 
assumed that spiritual valor would compensate for Iraq’s technological edge. Military 
planning and issues of strategy and tactics were cast aside for the sake of martyrdom and 
sacrifice.”101  The Iran–Iraq War, therefore, becomes this study’s first example of how 
the Islamic Republic mobilized its masses and fought an ideological, religious war—a 
war which it believed was a battle between the forces of good and evil. Chapter VI 
examines and analyzes the Iran–Iraq war within this religious context.   
99 Nasr, The Shia Revival, Kindle Locations 1619–1634. 
100 Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, Kindle Location 1570. 
101 Ibid. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter introduced the basic doctrines of Shia Islam and 
highlighted a few of the most important Shia narratives. It familiarized the reader to the 
events surrounding the Sunni-Shia split and to the injustices the Shia have carried with 
them—injustices which are genuinely felt and passionately re-enacted each year during 
the Day of Ashura commemoration. This chapter also examined Twlever Shia Islam’s 
messianic outlook, the role of the Mahdi (the Hidden Imam) in Iran’s end-times beliefs 
and the current Supreme Leader’s place as the Hidden Imam’s deputy under the current 
Islamic government. Khomeini’s theory of velayat-e faqih (governance by religious 
scholars) was highlighted alongside his role in shaping the context surrounding the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. And finally, once the revolution occurred, this chapter discussed two 
important events—the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis and the Iran–Iraq War—that helped 
solidify the Khomeini rule and make the regime what it is today under his successor, 
Ayatollah Khamenei.   
As Moghaddam explains in The Psychology of Dictatorship, “the normative 
system regulating leader-follower relations in Khomeini’s Iran has to be understood in 
the larger context of Shi’a Islam.”102  This concept, in short, is what this chapter set out 
to accomplish. Although condensed, the details from this chapter now set the stage for 
understanding the complexities of Iran’s current regime. The next chapter analyzes the 
roles and functions Iran’s Supreme Leader, other select government institutions, as well 
as contemporary issues facing Iran that are germane to this thesis.   
 
102 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 168. 
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IV. THE CURRENT REGIME  
In 1989, the Islamic Republic of Iran began to alter its course, albeit still down a 
familiar path, but with new challenges and new leadership. The end of the Iran–Iraq War 
marked an era of reconstruction and a much-needed focus on domestic issues. Most 
importantly, however, was the June 1989 death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of 
Iran’s Islamic government and leader of the revolution. The Assembly of Experts, the 
constitutional body charged with selecting the new leader, chose Ali Khamenei to replace 
Khomeini as Iran’s second Supreme Leader. The following chapter briefly outlines the 
current Iranian regime under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This chapter’s purpose is to 
give the reader a feel for the complex nature of how the Islamic Republic is governed 
today, and the difficulty in predicting and understanding, as an outsider, how the regime 
makes decisions.  
In 2010, the Rand Corporation under a contract with the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense published a book titled, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads103: An Exploration of 
Iranian Leadership Dynamics. The book’s objective is to provide a “framework to help 
policymakers and analysts better understand existing and evolving leadership dynamics 
driving Iranian decisionmaking.”104  Although Iran’s constitution provides the Islamic 
Republic a formal structure for governing, one of the primary conclusions in this book, as 
well as many other scholarly reports, is that Iran’s governing process relies on key 
personalities and factions within informal networks to get business done. The Rand book, 
therefore, dedicates one full chapter to understanding the complexity of Iran’s 
factionalism and informal networks. Beginning with the Supreme Leader at the center of 
“this complex web of interrelationships,” the authors assert that “it is the combination of 
key personalities, networks based on a number of commonalities, and institutions—not 
103 Bonyads are foundations “which function as independent economic entities and patronage 
networks unaccountable to the state.” The Supreme Leader appoints the bonyad directors. David E. Thaler 
et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, 25. 
104 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, Preface. 
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any one of these elements alone—that defines the political system of the Islamic 
Republic.”105     
A. THE SUPREME LEADER 
As a mid-level cleric appointed to the supreme leadership, Khamenei lacked the 
religious credentials—the title of marja-i-taqlid (source of emulation)—required by the 
constitution.106 The Assembly of Experts, therefore, made him temporary Supreme 
Leader, and then reconfirmed him after the 1989 constitutional amendment eliminated the 
requirement of marja-i-taqlid for Supreme Leader.107  Although he started his new tenure 
with meager religious qualifications, Ali Khamenei, by 1989, had already sharpened his 
political and military administrative skills. Under his predecessor, he served briefly as the 
minister of defense, supervisor of the Revolutionary Guards, and as a two-term president 
during the bulk of the Iran–Iraq War.108   
Thus, at the onset of his new appointment, Khamenei used his political acumen 
and trusted network to build the foundation of an overarching bureaucracy—the Office of 
the Supreme Leader—composed of his most loyal friends and trusted associates.109  
Mehdi Khalaji, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute and a Qom-trained Shiite 
theologian, explains that because Khamenei “lacked his predecessor’s charisma and 
religious and political credentials … he was compelled to devise a sophisticated system 
in which the president’s power was inherently limited. And indeed, over time, this system 
has had the effect of gradually reducing the president’s power and capabilities to the 
benefit of the Supreme Leader.”110     
Sadjadpour provides a concise, yet thorough statement of Ali Khamenei’s 
importance to Iran and to the world:  “There are few leaders in the world more important 
105 Ibid., 41. 
106 Farideh Farhi, “The Assembly of Experts,” The Iran Primer, accessed July 14, 2014, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/assembly-experts. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Sadjadpour, “The Supreme Leader.” 
109 Khalaji, Tightening the Reins: How Khamenei Makes Decisions, 20. 
110 Ibid., 35. 
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to current world affairs but less understood than Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader 
of Iran. He is the single most powerful individual in a highly factionalized, autocratic 
regime. No major decisions can be taken without his consent, and his top priorities are his 
own survival and that of the Islamic Republic.”111 
After 25 years as the Supreme Leader, Khamenei has managed to centralize his 
authority by staffing his office with, as Khalaji notes, “a new generation of politicians 
with military or security backgrounds …. This approach has gradually transformed the 
country’s top military structure—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—into a 
key player in Iranian politics and economics.”112  Although Khamenei has solidified his 
role as the most powerful person in Iran and the regime’s key decision-maker, he should 
not be considered all-powerful. As noted by the Rand report, the Supreme Leader 
exercises “unquestioned authority over most affairs of state and society in Iran. The 
reality, however, is somewhat less stark. Certainly, the more central an issue—such as the 
nuclear program or internal security—is to the regime’s survival, the more insular the 
decisionmaking around Khamenei and the less room there is for others to influence the 
debate.”113   
Many questions remain about the future of the position and Office (bureaucracy) 
of the Supreme Leader. Will the Assembly of Experts and/or the aging Khamenei appoint 
a replacement before he dies?  What key personality, institution, or faction will rise to fill 
the leadership void before or after Khamenei’s death?  While research cannot answer 
these questions, the following sections of this chapter describe the institutions that serve 
“as a backdrop or playing field for informal give and take among the individuals, 
networks, and factions that the Supreme Leader oversees, brokers, and, at times, 
engages.”114 
111 Sadjadpour, “The Supreme Leader.” 
112 Khalaji, Tightening the Reins: How Khamenei Makes Decisions, v. 
113 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, 45–
46. 
114 Ibid., 116. 
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B. THE GUARDIAN COUNCIL AND ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS 
The Guardian Council, as its name indicates, is a 12-member council of Islamic 
jurisprudents and legal scholars charged with protecting “the commands of Islam, and the 
constitution from discord with the proceedings of the Islamic Consultative Assembly” 
(the Iranian parliament, commonly known as the Majlis).115  One of the Guardian 
Council’s main functions, then, is to review all legislation to ensure its compatibility with 
Islamic principles before the law is passed and implemented.116  The Guardian Council is 
also charged with vetting candidates and supervising the elections for the President of the 
Republic, the Leadership Council of Experts (the Assembly of Experts), and the Iranian 
Parliament (Majlis).117  
The Supreme Leader appoints six Islamic jurisprudents to serve six-year terms on 
the Guardian Council. The other half are appointed by the Iranian parliament “at the 
recommendation of the head of the judiciary, who is in turn appointed by the Supreme 
Leader.”118  Thus, the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council “wield far more power 
than elected institutions like the presidency and parliament. The Guardian Council has 
the authority to vet all candidates for public office and disqualify any who are not 
deemed sufficiently loyal to the supreme leader.”119   
The Assembly of Experts—an elected body of 86 clerics—has the unique 
responsibility for selecting, supervising, and removing the Supreme Leader.120 In theory, 
this assembly could act as a powerful check against the Supreme Leader; however, since 
the Guardian Council essentially approves all candidates (Islamic jurists and scholars), 
the assembly’s elected members “have been vetted to exclude reformers or critics since 
1991.”121  The process of voting in Iran offers the pretense of a republic, with “free and 
115 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
181. 
116 Ibid., 182. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, 29. 
119 Sadjadpour, “The Supreme Leader.” 
120 Farhi, “The Assembly of Experts.” 
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fair elections.” However, it is more likely that the function of voting in Iran aligns more 
with instructions found in The Dictator’s Handbook—that “rigged elections are a 
warning to powerful politicians that they are expendable if they deviate from the leader’s 
desired path.”122    
C. THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reports directly to the Supreme 
Leader and is the most powerful military and security organization in Iran—responsible 
for protecting the regime and the principles of the Islamic revolution at home and 
abroad.123  During the eight-year Iran–Iraq War, Ayatollah Khomeini built the IRGC into 
a parallel armed forces structure—providing the regime with a loyal army, navy, and air 
guard corps—in addition to the less trusted regular Iranian armed forces (the Artesh) that 
carried over from the Shah’s military.124  According to a 2014 Jane’s security 
assessment, “the IRGC is composed of five main branches:  Ground Forces, Air Force, 
Navy, Basij militia, and the Qods Force special operations branch.”125   
Following the Iran–Iraq War, the IRGC gained a strong economic foothold in Iran 
by engaging in post-war reconstruction activities. More recently, the Guards have 
“benefitted from international sanctions and Iran’s isolation…The IRGC’s ability to tap 
into state funds and its relatively vast independent resources have provided a decisive 
advantage. Under Ahmadinejad, the Guards have been awarded hundreds of no-bid 
government contracts in addition to billions of dollars in loans for construction, 
infrastructure and energy projects.”126 
Alireza Nader, an Iran expert at the Rand Corporation, suggests that “Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards have formed a symbiotic 
122 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good 
Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 61. 
123 Nader, “The Revolutionary Guards.” 
124 Ibid. 
125 IHS Jane’s, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Iran, January 29, 2014, 10, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/JMSAHome.aspx?Category=JMSA&Tab=SEC
URITYCOUNTRYRISK&Country=Iran. 
126 Nader, “The Revolutionary Guards.” 
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relationship that buttresses the supreme leader’s authority and preserves the status 
quo.”127  On the other hand, Nader also explains that the IRGC “faces internal divisions 
which could potentially weaken Khamenei’s hand in a moment of crisis.”128   The IRGC 
could therefore play a significant role in selecting a new Supreme Leader once Khamenei 
dies. The Rand report speculates that “if the Guards continue to gain political power, they 
could begin to see themselves as kingmakers and demand more from the Supreme Leader 
and the clerics. Or, the IRGC may…make a bid for power in the next several years, 
possibly even challenging the Assembly of Experts in selecting the next Supreme 
Leader.”129   
1. The IRGC Qods Force 
The Qods force is the IRGC’s elite external operations unit numbering about 
5,000 strong.130  According to a September 2013 report from the Center for a New 
American Security (CNAS), the Qods Force mission is remarkably broad, suggesting the 
unit has missions similar to the Central Intelligence Agency, Special Forces, and the State 
Department rolled into one.131  The report’s authors, Scott Modell and David Asher, list 
the following Qods Force primary missions:  
• Conduct covert action and tactical intelligence collection, with operations 
designed to organize, train, equip, and finance Islamic movements and 
pro-Iran militants around the world;  
• Direct and support assassinations, mainly against Western and Israeli 
targets;  
• Conduct covert diplomacy;  
• Lead the planning and forward deployment of IRGC forces as the central 
piece of Iran’s asymmetrical warfare doctrine;  
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, 
121. 
130 Nader, “The Revolutionary Guards.” 
131 Scott Modell and David Asher, Pushback: Countering the Iran Action Network (Center for a New 
American Security (CNAS), September 5, 2013), 9, http://www.cnas.org/publications/pushback-
countering-iran-action-network. 
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• Engage in covert influence and spread the resistance via cultural, social, 
economic, political, and business entities and organizations; and  
• Build a global commercial apparatus designed to acquire new 
technologies, assist with government covert action programs, create new 
sources of revenue and add to existing threat facilitation networks.132 
In its most recent annual “Country Reports on Terrorism,” the U.S. Department of 
State concluded that, since 2012, the U.S. has “seen a resurgence of activity by Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force (IRGC-QF) the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence 
and Security (MOIS), and Tehran’s ally Hizballah.”133  The Qods force is believed to be 
behind the 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. via a mass casualty 
attack in Washington , DC.134  
A 2014 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment on Iran concludes that since Iran’s 
conventional military “is no match for U.S. or Israeli power, Iran is considered to be 
strong in its asymmetric, irregular, and proxy warfare capability…the IRGC and its Qods 
elite Force have been successful in its covert or open operations overseas on many 
occasions.”135  Furthermore, the same Jane’s report explains that Iran’s doctrine of 
“asymmetric warfare” is designed to counter threats “from a much larger and more 
powerful adversary” and, as demonstrated in the 2004 Ashura-5 military exercise, “seeks 
to identify and exploit Iranian military advantages in any war with a foreign power.”136  
2. The Basij Militia 
The Basij militia is one of the five main IRGC branches specifically tasked to 
preserve internal security and protect the Islamic Republic against foreign 
132 Ibid. 
133 “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of State, (April 30, 2014), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/225406.htm. 
134 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee Hearing: 
Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat, 2013, 11, 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-hezbollah%E2%80%99s-strategic-shift-
global-terrorist-threat. 
135 IHS Jane’s, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Iran, 9. 
136 Ibid., 91. 
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intervention.137  According to Jane’s, the Basij force has an estimated active strength of 
90,000 paramilitary volunteers and a probable mobilization capacity of 1.5 million.138  
The Basijis are essentially “the eyes and ears of the Islamic regime and are considered 
extremely loyal.”139  They are well known for their sometimes-brutal tactics in enforcing 
Islamic law, dress, and customs in Iran and they are rewarded with financial and material 
incentives for their loyalty and service.140  
Ali Alfoneh, an IRGC expert and researcher at the American Enterprise Institute, 
explains that the neighborhood mosque functions as Basij headquarters and, according to 
the Basij statute, “members are selected or recruited under the supervision of ‘clergy of 
the neighborhoods.’”141  Iran claims to have 70,000 Basij bases throughout the country, 
which includes elements of the Pupil Basij (ages 12 to 18), the University Basij, and the 
Tribal and Public Basij units.”142  The primary goal of the Pupil Basij, for example, is not 
so much to prepare the young student for paramilitary training, as it is “to reinforce 
support for the regime through ideological dissemination.”143 
3. Hezbollah 
Hezbollah, translated as “Party of God,” emerged in the mid-1980s as a Lebanese-
based resistance movement against Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. The organization has 
since grown to become a strong military force, a Shia terrorist group—backed by Iran 
and the Assad regime in Syria—and a powerful political party in Lebanon. In 1983, 
Hezbollah targeted the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon killing 
nearly 300 Americans and Lebanese in two separate vehicle bomb attacks. Before the 
137 Ibid., 7. 
138 Ibid., 6. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, 63. 
141 Ali Alfoneh, “The Basij Resistance Force,” The Iran Primer, accessed June 26, 2014, 
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September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, Hezbollah had killed more Americans 
than any other terrorist group.144   
Iran’s IRGC Qods Force was the driving force that created, funded, and trained 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Notably, the Qods Force continues to have a controlling interest 
in Hezbollah to this day.145  Referring to Iran, the Qods Force, and Hezbollah, a senior 
U.S. government official testified to Congress that, “It is important to realize that where 
you find one—you find the other. The Qods Force was responsible for standing-up 
Hezbollah, and has leveraged and exploited the intimate relationship those groups share 
on countless occasions over the years.”146   
In the 2013 CNAS report, authors Scott Modell and David Asher define the Iran 
Action Network as three key organizations: the IRGC Qods Force, the Iranian Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and Lebanese Hezbollah.147  According to the report, 
these organizations are “involved in crafting and implementing the covert elements of 
Iran’s foreign policy agenda, from terrorism, political, economic, and social subversion; 
to illicit finance, weapons, and narcotics trafficking.”148   
D. THE PRESIDENT  
The 1989 constitutional revision abolished the position of prime minister, giving 
the office of President of the Islamic Republic more power and influence—a 
development that has, at times, conflicted with the Supreme Leader’s authority. Each 
elected president since 1989 has, despite being overshadowed by Khamenei, “put his own 
distinct mark on the country.”149       
144 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Hezbollah’s Global Reach, 
2006, 1, http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/30143.pdf. 
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Iran’s fourth president, Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997), for example, focused 
on rebuilding the post-war economy and advanced a pragmatic social and foreign agenda. 
During his second term, however, “he lost the initiative to the Supreme Leader and 
conservatives.”150 Iran’s reformist president, Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005), 
endeavored to open a dialogue with the outside world and advance a liberal political 
agenda, but his efforts were thwarted by Khamenei’s office and by opposition from 
hardliners.151   
On the other hand, Khamenei’s support of a relatively obscure candidate, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), enabled him to win the presidency in 2005 and 
again in the disputed 2009 elections. Following the 2009 elections, up to three million 
frustrated, but peaceful, protestors—calling themselves the Green Movement—took to 
the street to complain that the election results were manipulated in favor of Ahmadinejad 
when his popular opponent, former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, was projected 
to win.152  The Green Movement’s post-election day demonstration caught the regime off 
guard, resulting in the deployment of IRGC and Basij units. The paramilitary forces 
employed harsh tactics as “thousands of protesters were beaten, hundreds were arrested 
and dozens were killed by snipers.”153 The crack down on peaceful demonstrators, 
according to Mehdi Khalaji, “harmed both Khamenei’s personal image and that of the 
Islamic Republic…leading many Muslims throughout the world to question the regime’s 
religious legitimacy. Moreover, Khamenei’s subsequent efforts to control Ahmadinejad 
effectively forced him to discredit the same person he wanted to keep in power in 
2009.”154  Khamenei ultimately withdrew his support from Ahmadinejad when the latter 
began to exert presidential independence from the IRGC and Supreme Leader in an 
attempt to expand his own sphere of political and economic influence.155   
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Ahmadinejad’s often hostile and aggressive posture towards Israel and the United 
States put him in the spotlight of the international news media—especially with his 
outspoken denial of the Holocaust.156  As a populist president, he served in stark contrast 
to that of his reformist-minded predecessor Muhammad Khatami. Instead of seeking a 
rapprochement with the West, “he challenged America’s international dominance and… 
pushed ahead with its [Iran’s] nuclear fuel enrichment program, despite new United 
Nations and U.S. sanctions between 2006 and 2010.”157  And many of Ahmadinejad’s 
U.N. General Assembly speeches call for the hastening of the return of al-Mahdi, the 
Twelfth Imam. The next two chapters will discuss Ahmadinejad’s messianic inclinations 
in more detail as they relate to this thesis.  
In June 2013, Hassan Rouhani succeeded Ahmadinejad as Iran’s new president. 
Many outsiders have been speculating how Iran might change under Rouhani’s 
leadership. Suzanne Maloney, an Iranian expert from the Brookings Institution, described 
Rouhani as “a blunt pragmatist with plenty of experience maneuvering within Iran’s 
theocratic system… He embraced reformist rhetoric during the campaign, but will not 
deviate too far from the system’s principles, the foremost of which is the primacy of the 
Supreme Leader.”158  Moreover, Khalaji notes that “Rouhani has sought common ground 
with the Supreme Leader on issues such as reducing the IRGC’s role in the country’s 
economy. The Supreme Leader, in turn, has been generally supportive of Rouhani’s 
efforts in the nuclear talks with the West.”159  Figure 3 illustrates the relationships and 
connections within Iran’s Power structure. 
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Figure 3.  Iran’s Power Structure.160 
E. FOREIGN POLICY AND RELIGION 
Due to changing international context since the 1979 revolution and Iran’s 
subsequent isolation from the West, its foreign policy has naturally gravitated toward 
Russia and China to the East. For example, the demise of the Soviet Union coincided 
with the death of Khomeini and the rise of a more pragmatic regime under then president 
Hashemi Rafsanjani—a leader who was “willing to take advantage of opportunities that 
the dogmatic Khomeini might have missed.”161  As Rafsanjani opened the doors of 
dialogue with the new Russian Federation following the Iran–Iraq War, he certainly did 
so with the new Supreme Leader’s blessing. As Takeyh notes, “even Khamenei and the 
conservatives understood that Iran’s need for trade and diplomatic assistance made the 
160 Mehrzad Boroujerdi and Kourosh Rahimkhani, “Iran’s Power Structure,” The Iran Primer, 
accessed October 6, 2013, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-power-structure. 
161 Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs, 151. 
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preservation of the Russian card a strategic necessity.”162  As a result of this 
rapprochement with Moscow, Iran received nuclear technology from Russia and, in 
return, Moscow received much-needed funds.163  Thus, due to Russia’s “more charitable 
assessment of Iran’s intentions, its ample commercial incentives, and its desire to defy 
the United States,” the relationship between Moscow and Tehran has remained relatively 
strong to this day.164  
 Moreover, since the 1979 revolution, “Iran’s relations with China also flourished 
more than those of any other country partly because they were uncomplicated by issues 
of terrorism and human rights.”165  In the 1990s, for example, Iran signed numerous 
contracts with China for weapons and nuclear technology, in exchange for oil payments 
to a China “who was growing ever more dependent on Middle Eastern energy 
supplies.”166  Iran, however, largely ignored the plight of repressed Chinese Muslims in 
order to complete its deals with Beijing.167  
On the other hand, as opportunities emerged for some European Union countries 
and Persian Gulf states to develop relations with Iran, the Islamic Republic found it 
difficult to overlook its religious ideology—as it had done with Russia and China—in 
exchange for mutually beneficial relations.  “For many within the theocratic state,” 
Takeyh explains, “Iran’s charge remained the redemption of Khomeini’s Islamist 
mission. In terms of its approach to Western Europe and the Persian Gulf region, Iran 
could not divest itself from its radical heritage.”168  Thus, Iran has chosen a more 
pragmatic approach with Russia and China, which, along with Iran, are “concerned about 
the evolving nature of the post-cold war international order and the prospects of a 
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West to work with Iran will likely be met with a larger dose of religious ideology than 
pragmatism. Furthermore, the present situation in Syria and Israel, involving Iran’s allies 
Hezbollah and Hamas respectively is causing Iran and, by default its proxies, to become 
more isolated from not only the West, but also the Islamic world.170  As a result, Iran will 
continue to become more reliant on Russia and China.  
F. INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND RELIGION 
According to Jane’s, Iran’s domestic policies with regard to religion can be 
divided into three main positions:  “hardliners who regard civil society as antithetical to 
the basic values of the Islamic Republic; those who want to Islamicise civil society and 
make it more palatable to their interpretation of Iran’s ideological beliefs and values; and 
those who view civil society positively, as useful in structuring state-society relations and 
promoting democracy and pluralism.”171  While Rouhani has encouraged a move toward 
liberalizing some of the regime’s policies, according to Jane’s, he will likely prioritize 
“appeasing the more powerful conservative factions than the reformists.”172  Popular 
opposition to the regime is believed to be strong, as evidenced by Green Movement 
protests following the 2009 presidential election; however, the regime’s often brutal 
efforts to suppress opposition movements severely limits their ability to flourish and 
challenge the status quo.173  
The regime feels threatened by liberalism and “liberal” thinking, especially in 
urban areas where the population is more educated and exposed to liberal ideas.174  In 
particular, the rise of women in higher education and the incursion of “Western ideas” 
about the role of women have alarmed the hardliner and reformist factions alike.175  As a 
result, the regime has attempted to limit entry of women to universities and to promote 
170 Moghaddam, Online Discussion, August 8, 2014. 
171 IHS Jane’s, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Iran, Article #4, Page 7 of 9. 
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the woman’s role in the home—as a mother, bearing and raising multiple children.176  
Recently, the regime has rescinded its free birth control program in an effort to 
essentially double its population from 80 million to 150 or 200 million.177  
On May 20, 2014, the Supreme Leader announced 14 general policies to boost 
Iran’s population, charging government institutions to adopt essential measures “in a 
careful, rapid and powerful way.”178  Khamenei’s general policies on population include:  
“promoting the formation of family and giving birth to more children, encouraging youth 
to marry at a younger age… and enabling them to afford the cost of living and to raise 
righteous and competent children.”179  The more religious aspects of Khamenei’s 
population growth policy include:  “promoting and establishing an Islamic-Iranian 
lifestyle and confronting the negative aspects of western lifestyle…[and] strengthening 
the factors (Iranian, Islamic and revolutionary) which bring about national identity.”180  
Notably, Khamenei focuses on promoting a stronger Islamic and Iranian national identity 
to resist the outgroup Western way of life. As Moghaddam points out, “the significance 
of threats to collective identity become clear when one considers situations in which 
sacred carriers representing the ingroup are threatened.”181  For example, the Islamic 
hejab (veil), as a sacred carrier, symbolizes the ingroup’s adherence to Islamic principles 
and also “the control of women in the public sphere.”182  Women in Iran who embrace 
“Western values” and “liberal thinking,” therefore, become a target of displaced 
aggression by fundamentalist men who “try to drive women out of the public sphere and 
back into the home.”183   
176 Ibid. 
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The regime’s effort to boost population growth by limiting access to birth control, 
and even (as of this writing) considering the criminalization of permanent methods of 
contraception, can also be seen as a move to strengthen internal security.184  A larger 
population will not only strengthen Iran’s manpower, it will also relegate women to the 
more traditional role of motherhood—so, in theory, there would be fewer “liberal 
women” causing problems for the regime.185  In The Psychology of Dictatorship, 
Moghaddam explains that in dictatorships, “there is a return to the need for women to 
have large numbers of offspring… Above all, dictatorships have manufactured an ideal of 
womanhood that centers on sacrifice and the unique ability of women to sacrifice for 
others, with special emphasis on national sacrifice.”186  
G. OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES 
The Supreme Leader and IRGC retain control over Iran’s most lethal weapons 
systems as well as Iran’s economic lifeline—the oil and gas industry. During the time of 
this writing, Iran, the United States and the other “P5+1” nations are engaged in Iranian 
nuclear enrichment negotiations in exchange for possible Iran sanctions relief. To 
complicate matters, Israel has threatened a pre-emptive attack against Iran’s nuclear 
facilities if Iran were allowed to continue enrichment with the capability of developing of 
a nuclear weapon. Thus, the stakes are high for Iran, the international community, and the 
stability of the Middle East. Beginning with Iran’s oil and gas reserves, the following 
paragraphs briefly touch on these two important issues. 
1. Oil and Gas Reserves 
Iran’s oil and gas reserves are perhaps its greatest asset and, at the same time, its 
greatest economic crutch. Iran is the fifth largest oil producer in the world and has the 
second largest natural gas reserves, second only to the Russian Federation.187  According 
184 Moghaddam, Online Discussion, July 22, 2014. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 138. 
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to Fareed Mohamedi, a partner at PFC Energy, a Washington, DC-based oil and gas 
consultancy, “Iran’s oil and gas sectors have critical structural problems. Subsidized 
prices and a population that has doubled since the 1979 revolution have created excessive 
demand. Supply has been stymied by underinvestment caused by financial constraints, 
technical shortages and sanctions.”188  The most egregious problem, however, is the 
misuse of gas and oil revenues, which are siphoned through IRGC-controlled 
companies.189   
With regard to Iran’s dependence upon, and control over its abundant oil and gas 
reserves, Dr. Moghaddam poses perhaps the most relevant question, and also provides a 
logical answer:  “How long can the dictatorships of the Near and Middle East continue?  
One answer is that they can continue as long as the oil reserves last. With oil revenues at 
their disposal, the local dictators can support huge security systems to stifle dissent at 
home, and gain the support of foreign powers by assuring stability and payment for 
lucrative arms sales and other imports.”190   
Therefore, as long as the Iranian elites are profiting from oil revenues, and 
perhaps more so because of the sanctions, it is likely the Islamic Republic will continue 
down the same path—provided oil prices do not drop. Mohamedi predicts that “falling oil 
and gas output and lower oil prices will weaken the government’s ability to stimulate the 
economy, which could result in slower economic growth and higher unemployment.”191  
Furthermore, if the nuclear talks end without an agreement, international sanctions will 
likely slow investments in oil and gas—leading to lower output and a worsening 
economy.192     
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to 
Destroy, Kindle Locations 1116–1121. 
191 Mohamedi, “The Oil and Gas Industry.” 
192 Ibid. 
 53 
                                                 
2. The Nuclear Issue 
The deliberative body responsible for “designing Iran’s defense and security 
policies and responding to internal and external threats” is the small, but high-level 
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).193  On September 10, 2013, Iran’s Foreign 
Minister Mohammad Zarif announced to the press that “the policies and decisions on 
[the] nuclear issue will be made in the Supreme National Security Council” (as quoted by 
Mehdi Khalaji from an article in Farsi).194  Although the president is the head of SNSC, 
Khamenei appoints the secretary and, according to Khalaji, “the council [SNSC] has no 
agenda independent from the will and policies of the Supreme Leader, who is represented 
usually by the council’s secretary—whose role prevails over that of the president.”195 
Although Rouhani brings extensive experience to the SNSC—as Iran’s former 
chief nuclear negotiator during the Khatami administration—he is, therefore, only the 
nominal chair of the council. Khamenei took over the nuclear portfolio in 2005, and his 
appointee, the SNSC secretary, is charged with leading nuclear negotiations, “reporting 
directly to the Supreme Leader, and briefing the president at random.”196  Hence, by 
monitoring Khamenei’s statements and general attitude toward the negotiations, Western 
analysts might produce a more accurate assessment of Iran’s stance in the talks than by 
any other analysis offered by the media. One must assume that the SNSC’s guidance to 
the negotiators will ultimately conform to the Supreme Leader’s will. 
Putting the current round of negotiations aside, the real concern to the U.S. and 
Israel, is the long held assumption that Iran—through its uranium enrichment program—
will develop a nuclear weapons program. And a nuclear-armed Iran would significantly 
change the balance of Sunni and Shia power in the Middle East, and pose a direct threat 
to Israel’s existence.  
193 Khalaji, Tightening the Reins: How Khamenei Makes Decisions, viii. 
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During his October 1, 2013, speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 
Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to take unilateral action to 
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.  “He fooled the world once. Now he 
thinks he can fool it again. You see, Rohani [sic] thinks he can have his yellow cake and 
eat it too,” remarked Netanyahu, further stating that a nuclear armed Iran would be 50 
times more dangerous that a nuclear North Korea.197  In response, Iran denied seeking 
nuclear weapons and warned Netanyahu against making a “miscalculation.”198 
On the other hand, the IRGC leadership believes that it will be the United States, 
Israel’s patron, who will be the impetus behind any Israeli pre-emptive strike against 
Iran. In 2012, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC aerospace branch, 
threatened to target the U.S. if Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear facilities.  “For this reason,” 
Hajizadeh stated, “we will enter a confrontation with both parties and will definitely be at 
war with American bases should a war break out.”199   
The ultimate dilemma the United States and Israel must address, then, is that of 
Iran as a nuclear state, and how Hezbollah as Iran’s client might play into a challenge and 
response nuclear scenario. In recent congressional testimony, Mr. Will Fulton, an Iranian 
analyst with the American Enterprise Institute, explained, “Iran is first and foremost 
concerned with regime preservation… Iran’s leaders have crafted a national security 
policy designed to protect the regime from external threats by demonstrating a capability 
to strike U.S. and Israeli interests anywhere in the world.”200  With this in mind, potential 
answers to this project’s research question—whether  Iran’s religious beliefs could 
influence its strategic plans for war—are examined and analyzed in the next two chapters.   
 
  
197 “Netanyahu Threatens Unilateral Action Against Iran,” Al Akhbar English, accessed March 15, 
2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/netanyahu-threatens-unilateral-action-against-iran. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Associated Press, “Iran: If Attacked by Israel, We’ll Target U.S.,” accessed April 17, 2014, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-if-attacked-by-israel-well-target-us/. 
200 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, “Subcommittee Hearing: Hezbollah’s 
Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat,” March 20, 2013, p. 10. 
 55 
                                                 




The previous two chapters have introduced the reader to the basics of Shia Islam, 
outlined the events surrounding the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and examined Iran’s current 
power structure. This essential knowledge, therefore, critically serves as the context for 
the remainder of this thesis. The next two chapters move this thesis forward in a more 
research-oriented direction with this chapter discussing the research findings, and chapter 
VI interpreting and analyzing the findings.   
The following paragraphs present two interconnected sets of findings. First, 
through a grounded theory process of coding and analyzing mostly primary source data, 
several themes or categories emerged. These categories were examined for patterns and 
connections and then synthesized into three religious narratives. The narratives serve as 
the backdrop or context for the sacred carriers and religious tools the Iranian regime 
could use to mobilize or launch attacks against U.S. interests at home or abroad 
(discussed in the next chapter).      
A. PRIMARY SOURCES AND EMERGING CATEGORIES 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, grounded theories are drawn from data 
that “are likely to offer insight, enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful guide 
to action.”201  The data used to identify and capture the most relevant insights, therefore, 
come from the writings, speeches and works of Iran’s most influential and contemporary 
leaders. Unrelated categories and topics surfaced, but were discarded unless they 
connected in some way to the scope of this project.    
1. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—First Supreme Leader of Iran 
(1979–1989) 
The book Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, 
translated and annotated by Hamid Algar in 1981, became this project’s primary source 
for analyzing Ayatollah Khomeini’s major writings, speeches and interviews before, 
201 Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research, 12. 
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during, and immediately following the 1979 revolution. The major work examined in this 
compilation was Khomeini’s treatise titled Islamic Government in which he presents his 
case and evidence for instituting an Islamic government on Earth. Additional writings, 
speeches and interviews from Khomeini were also analyzed with the goal of looking for 
emerging themes and concepts.   
The major categories emerging from Khomeini’s written thoughts, therefore, 
revolve around the following:  a) abolishing the evils of monarchy, moral decay, and 
corruption; b) eliminating and fighting against foreign oppression and imperialism; c) 
guarding against conspiracies that threaten Islam; d) the theme of justice and 
establishment of Sharia Islamic law; and e) the importance of sacrifice and martyrdom 
for Islam. Other categories include derogatory, anti-West sentiments against America, 
capitalism, and themes of enmity toward Israel, Jews, and Zionism.   
2. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran establishes an Islamic 
government and codifies the roles, responsibilities, and duties of the Supreme Leader, the 
president of Iran, and the judicial and legislative branches. Beyond serving its intended 
purpose—establishing the foundational laws and government for the Islamic Republic—
the categories observed in this document are primarily twofold falling along the lines of:  
a) duties and responsibilities of the clergy, the elected government, and Muslim 
citizens; and b) safeguarding the revolution and the Islamic nature of the government. 
The constitution calls for an “An Ideological Army” (the regular Army and the IRGC) to 
defend Iran’s borders and protect the “weight of the ideological mission.”202  
3. Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei—Second Supreme Leader of Iran 
(1989–Present) 
The primary source highlighting the works of the current Supreme Leader of Iran, 
Ayatollah Khamenei, is his English language website found at http://english.khamenei.ir. 
The website, The Center for Preserving and Publishing the Works of Grand Ayatollah 
202 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
164. 
 58 
                                                 
Sayyid Ali Khamenei, functions as a well-organized library containing the Supreme 
Leader’s current and archived speeches, messages and letters, teachings, and viewpoints 
on numerous topics. The “viewpoints” section, for example, highlights Khamenei’s 
thoughts and teachings regarding specific topics ranging from religion and history, to 
world issues, as well as his viewpoints on the Islamic Republic. In addition to his English 
website, Khamenei also uses social media to shape his narrative. As of June 2014, 
Khamenei’s English Twitter account (@khamenei_ir) claims more than 57,000 followers 
and, along with other social media platforms, is used to promote the Islamic Republic and 
denounce the United States and Israel.203  Although Twitter, Facebook and other social 
media are filtered and not available to the vast majority of Iranians, Khamenei’s Twitter 
followers likely live outside Iran or are the hardline trusted loyalists who are given 
access.    
The major categories emerging from Ayatollah Khamenei’s works are, in essence, 
variations of the same themes as his predecessor:  a) the necessity to safeguard the 
Islamic revolution through sacrifice and adherence to Islamic law; b) a consistent anti-
Zionism message; and c) guarding against Western conspiracies and eliminating 
foreign oppression.  “Khamenei has always been critical of liberal democracy and thinks 
that capitalism and the West are in inevitable long-term decline,” writes Akbar Ganji in a 
Foreign Affairs article.204  Khamenei’s primary concerns with the United States seem to 
emanate around what he believes are America’s imperialist and oppressive tendencies. As 
Ganji notes, Khamenei “sees Washington as inherently Islamophobic” and “he believes 
that the U.S. government is bent on regime change in Iran, whether through internal 
collapse, democratic revolution, economic pressure, or military invasion.”205  On 
February 25, 2014, for example, Khamenei’s office evoked the memory of the 1953 U.S.-
led coup of Iran’s democratically elected government and broadcasted the following 
message via Twitter: “Since 1945, 40 independent governments, elected by the people, 
203 Ali Khamenei, “Khamenei.ir (khamenei_ir) on Twitter,” accessed June 13, 2014, 
https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir. 




                                                 
have been toppled by the U.S. Government. This is the definition of arrogance.”206  The 
accompanying infographic is shown in Figure 4. Hence, the themes of Western 
conspiracies and oppression are interwoven into many of his speeches and writings.         
 
Figure 4.  Khamenei Tweet: “40 Independent Governments Toppled by the 
U.S. Government”  
 
206 https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/438227942317895680, February 25, 2014. 
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4. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—Sixth President of Iran (2005–2013)  
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sixth president of Iran and former mayor of Tehran, 
is well known for his uniquely bold and religiously themed speeches at the annual United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and for his controversial 2005 speech calling for 
Israel to be “wiped off the map.”  Ahmadinejad served two terms as president of Iran and, 
while he had his differences with Supreme Leader Khamenei, he represents a principlist 
faction of hardline conservative politicians, IRGC members, and clerics who remain 
“steadfast to the revolution’s ideals.”207  During his terms in office, Ahmadinejad 
remained deeply suspicious and defiant against the United States, Israel, and the West. 
Ahmadinejad’s thoughts and statements, therefore, need to be analyzed and understood in 
the context of this research project. 
The comment about Israel being “wiped off the map,” for example, seems to have 
been mistranslated. In a 2006 Guardian article, Jonathan Steele explains that 
Ahmadinejad’s statement should have been translated as “the regime occupying 
Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time”—a translation endorsed by the respected 
University of Michigan Professor Juan Cole. Steele speculates that the meaning of 
Ahmadinejad’s comment about Israel was more along the lines of Israel being 
“eliminated from the page of history” or “eliminated from the map of the world,” which 
is very different than Israel being “wiped off the map.”208  What is clear, however, is that 
Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israel and anti-Zionist sentiments represent major themes in his 
speeches. 
Other major themes or categories include Ahmadinejad’s strong belief in the 
pending appearance of the Hidden Imam, al-Mahdi, as one who will solve the world’s 
problems and bring justice and peace to mankind. Many of Ahmadinejad’s UNGA 
speeches refer to or call for the hastening of the return of al-Mahdi. Other major themes 
from his UNGA speeches include his strong aversion to the superpowers (America being 
the principal superpower) and his belief in their hegemonic ambitions to subjugate the 
207 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, 70. 
208 Jonathan Steele, “Lost in Translation,” The Guardian, June 14, 2006, sec. Comment is free, 
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world. Ahmadinejad attacks capitalism for its greediness and inefficiencies, and the 
themes of justice, rights, and equality are highlighted as important topics in his 
speeches.            
5. Hassan Rouhani—Seventh President of Iran (2013–Present) 
At the time of this writing, Hassan Rouhani, has been in office nearly one year. 
Consequently, the data sample of relevant primary sources is far less than his immediate 
predecessor. The following primary sources, therefore, were examined for emergent 
categories relevant to this project:  Rouhani’s 2013 UNGA speech; speeches and quotes 
from the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Presidency—English website; and Hassan Rouhani’s 
Twitter feed @HassanRouhani.  
It is clear that Rouhani’s objectives, at least during the first year of his presidency, 
revolve around rapprochement with the West and the international community—a stark 
contrast to the approach of his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. One could argue 
that Rouhani, a political moderate who ran on the promise to improve the economy, is 
presenting a friendlier attitude toward the West to open doors for international sanctions 
relief which would help to boost Iran’s economy. Three months after his presidency 
began, Rouhani wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post explaining that “I’m committed to 
fulfilling my promises to my people, including my pledge to engage in constructive 
interaction with the world.”209  Indeed, Rouhani’s foreign policy strategy aligns more 
closely with Mohammad Khatami, Iran’s fifth president. Khatami, in a CNN interview, 
for example, “called for a dialogue between the Iranian and the American people, a 
possible prelude to government talks.”210 
Rouhani’s narrative, therefore, does not include the same genre of bitterness 
toward the West and Israel. The prominent categories emerging from Rouhani’s speeches 
and interviews include: the recognition of Iran’s rights for autonomy (especially the 
209 Hassan Rouhani, “President of Iran Hassan Rouhani: Time to Engage,” The Washington Post, 
September 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-iran-hassan-rouhani-time-to-
engage/2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3-966c-9c4293c47ebe_story.html. 
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right to develop nuclear energy), fostering mutual respect between America and Iran, 
and statements against violence and extremism.   
Regarding the pursuit of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), the Rouhani administration vigorously claims that the possession and 
stockpiling of nuclear weapons is contrary to Shia Islam—based on a fatwa (a religious 
decree) issued by Khamenei—and that the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program is 
intended only for peaceful purposes. Although the regime claims that Khamenei issued a 
fatwa against WMDs, the edict has not been publicly released.211  Furthermore, using 
Khamenei’s presumed fatwa as evidence that nuclear weapons are “un-Islamic” does not 
seem to carry much weight since the regime does many other things contrary to Islam.212  
Nevertheless, Rouhani and his foreign minister, Javid Zarif, are marketing the theme that 
Iran is not a threat to the Middle East region, and that Iran is defensive-minded, and 
therefore would not go on the offensive. Speaking on behalf of their administration and 
their own beliefs, they are probably correct. However, they do not speak for other 
factions—especially hardliners in Iran who would be most likely to support a nuclear 
weapons program. Ahmadinejad’s hardline mentor Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, for 
example, “is theologically permitted to issue a contrary fatwa” that would endorse the 
procurement of nuclear weapons—an edict that would be binding on his followers.213 
B. FINALIZED CATEGORIES—NARRATIVES FROM THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
Step three in the research process identifies relationships, concepts, or patterns 
within categories that could lead to the development of a theory or a framework that 
offers insight and provides a meaningful guide to understand Iran.214  The categories 
listed from the aforementioned primary sources, therefore, were analyzed for 
connections, patterns, and emerging phenomenon. As a result, the following three 
211 IHS Jane’s, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Iran, Article #20 Page 17 of 18. 
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categories emerged as the most common narratives from the primary sources:  1) 
establishing a government representing true or pure Islam; 2) protecting the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the Revolution; and 3) fighting oppression and imperialism. Table 1 
illustrates how each theme relates to the three categories; however, because the themes 
are connected, they overlap and some are repeated in more than one column.  
 
Establishing a Government 
Representing True or Pure 
Islam  
Protecting the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the 
Revolution 
Fighting Oppression and 
Imperialism 
Divine inspiration, law and 
command through the Prophet 
Mohammed, the Imamate, and 
the Qur’an 
Guarding against conspiracies 
that threaten Islam 
The battle between good and evil, 
the oppressed and the oppressor 
Islamic government through 
velayat-e faqih - ‘the governance 
of the jurist’ (religious scholars) 
Iran’s armed forces will defend 
its borders and protect the regime  
The ongoing fight against 
oppressive, colonial governments 
and the greed of capitalism; a 
duty of all Muslims 
The theme of justice both in 
Islamic law and for the enemies 
of Islam 
Iran’s rights of self-determination 
and autonomy (especially within 
the context of the nuclear talks)  
Anti-America and anti-Western 
sentiments; the arrogance of 
superpowers 
Abolishing the evils of monarchy, 
moral decay, and corruption 
Abolishing the evils of moral 
decay, and corruption  
Anti-Israel and anti-Zionism 
Duties and responsibilities of 
Muslims and the Islamic 
government 
Sacrifice and martyrdom in 
defending the Islamic Republic 
Iran’s rights of self-determination 
and autonomy 
The importance of sacrifice and 
martyrdom as a duty  
Exporting the Revolution beyond 
Iran’s borders  
The rejection of violence and 
extremism 
Preparing for the reappearance of 
al-Mahdi through an Islamic 
government 
Preparing for the reappearance of 
al-Mahdi in future battle between 
good and evil 
The petition for mutual respect 
(especially from America) 
Table 1.   Finalized Categories 
These three categories, then, will be used as the major religious narratives going 
forward in this analysis. Narratives, in essence, are the stories and context that give 
meaning to action. In his book, The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, 
Environmental Collapse, Economic Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing 
Our World, Dr. Moghaddam explains how narratives work:  “Human beings are 
motivated to make their lives meaningful, and construct and ascribe meaning to 
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themselves, their actions, and their surroundings in all situations. The most pervasive 
strategy people use to make their lives meaningful is through the construction of 
narratives.”215  Thus, the collection of narratives as found in Table 1, become the 
religious frameworks for Iranian aggression. They serve as the backdrops or context 
behind the sacred carriers and tools—the enabling factors the Iranian regime could use to 
mobilize against or attack the United States and its interests. The next chapter introduces 
and examines Iran’s most prominent sacred carriers and religious tools, and then 
incorporates the findings into analytic scenarios that are relevant to U.S. national security 
interests.   
  
215 Fathali Moghaddam, The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, Environmental Collapse, 
Economic Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing Our World (Praeger, 2010), Kindle Location 
1285–1286. 
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This chapter implements step four in the research process: analyzing the patterns, 
connections and phenomenon, specifically through sacred carriers and tools, which 
emerge within the context of the three categories or religious narratives. The goal is to 
determine whether or not these elements emerge as significant factors in answering the 
research question. As mentioned in the introduction, the purpose of this research is not to 
predict whether or not Iran will act upon its religious beliefs, rather, it examines the 
religious options—the sacred carriers and tools—that could play a key role in future 
Iranian aggression directed at the United States.  
After a discussion of Iran’s sacred carriers and religious tools, this chapter 
presents three assessments that examine Iran’s sacred carriers and religious tools through 
the paradigms of past, present, and future scenarios. These three scenarios pull the 
findings and analysis together into examples that are relevant to U.S. national security 
interests.  
A. SACRED CARRIERS 
Sacred carriers can take the form of divinely appointed individuals, end-times 
signs or symbols, religious traditions, and holy sites, books, or documents. Moghaddam 
further explains that the “concept of carrier is broader and more dynamic than the 
traditional symbol in a number of ways.  Most important, carriers are about the narratives 
that construct, sustain, and propagate meaning.”216  An example of a sacred carrier in the 
Christian faith is the cross, which not only symbolizes the death of Christ, but also takes 
on a deeper meaning about a belief in God, and the importance of sacrifice.217  For the 
purposes of this research, then, a sacred carrier plays the role of a catalyst, a trigger, or an 
enabler to further propagate meaning and action. The following sacred carriers stood out 
as the most relevant within major narratives:  a) the Supreme Leader of Iran, b) the Day 
216 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 95. 
217 Moghaddam, The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, Environmental Collapse, Economic 
Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing Our World, Kindle Location 1392–2739. 
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of Ashura commemoration, and c) al-Mahdi—the Hidden Imam and promised savior in 
Twelver Shia Islam.  
1. The Supreme Leader of Iran 
The position of Supreme Leader in Iran is perhaps the most powerful sacred 
carrier at this point in Iran’s post-revolutionary history. Not only is the Supreme Leader 
the primary decision-maker in the Islamic Republic, he is also the deputy to the Hidden 
Imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi. While not all Iranians agree with the religious teachings of 
the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, it is his position as the IRGC commander-in-
chief, and his political control over the three branches of government that makes him a 
living sacred carrier and the ultimate authoritarian in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Moghaddam explains that “in dictatorships the dictator becomes a sacred carrier, and 
because as a sacred carrier his value and divinity become absolute, any form of 
disobedience to his dictates become unacceptable, just as turning one’s back to Christ or 
Mohammed or other divine messengers is unacceptable in the eyes of Christian and 
Muslim believers.”218  
Iran’s first and most influential supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 
defined Islamic government “as the rule of divine law over men.”219  As the supervisor 
and executor of that divine law in Iran, the position of supreme leader, becomes the most 
powerful sacred carrier, with the authority to lead the country down a path of aggression 
based on a religious notion.  “The word of the supreme leader in Iran is more than a 
command, it is a commandment,” writes Moghaddam, “Anyone who disobeys faces the 
ultimate punishment.”220   
The supreme leader and the ruling clergy can, therefore, enforce punishment 
through the IRGC and Basij militia. Whether or not the citizens of Iran agree with or 
want to follow the supreme leader is immaterial, as long as the IRGC backs the leader 
218 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 97. 
219 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini; Translated and 
Annotated by Hamid Algar, Kindle Location 681. 
220 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to 
Destroy, Kindle Location 922–2403. 
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and is therefore willing to suppress the people. The supreme leader/sacred carrier, 
therefore, needs a combination of religious authority and military force—through the 
IRGC and Basij militia—to keep control.  
2.   The Day of Ashura Commemoration 
The Day of Ashura (the 10th day of the Islamic month of Muharram) marks the 
martyrdom of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, and, according to 
Shia tradition, the rightful heir and divinely mandated leader of Islam.  (See Chapter III 
for additional information about the Day of Ashura, Imam Husayn, and the Battle of 
Karbala.)  The commemoration of the Day of Ashura, therefore, represents a very 
powerful sacred carrier not only as a ritualistic tradition, but more importantly, as a sign 
of religious identity. Vali Nasr describes Ashura as “an occasion for collective atonement 
through lamentation and self-flagellation. It is a distinctly Shia practice and has no 
parallel in Sunnism…Ashoura is a day when the Shias announce who they are—often 
going to great extremes to do so.”221   
The commemoration includes processions of young men, walking four abreast, 
beating their chests and whipping their backs as they rhythmically chant “Ya Husayn” in 
memory of Husayn.222  It is a day of atonement as participants weep and pray for 
forgiveness. And it is a day of drama as the Shia publicly and privately recount and the 
narrative of Husayn’s martyrdom. For Shias, the Day of Ashura, as a sacred carrier, 
conveys powerful themes relating to sacrifice, martyrdom, purity, and injustice. It is 
especially important as a symbolic means for Shia Muslims to mobilize physically and 
spiritually in remembrance of the sacrifice and martyrdom of Imam Husayn. 
3. Al-Mahdi—The Hidden Imam 
The twelfth “hidden” imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi, believed by the Shia to be the 
promised savior of Islam, also functions as divinely appointed sacred carrier. It is al-
Mahdi, the “Lord of the Age” who, according to Shia doctrine, will return to establish 
221 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, Kindle Locations 240–
243. 
222 Ibid., Kindle Locations 261–264. 
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justice and Islamic law throughout the world. Moreover, the mere belief in the final 
appearance of al-Mahdi as Allah’s appointed future world leader becomes a sacred carrier 
with millenarian implications.   
Also, of importance are the purported deplorable and oppressive conditions of the 
world, or “signs of the times” that will precede the prophesied reappearance of the 
Mahdi. According to the narrative, relief from suffering and injustice as a result of the re-
emergence of the Mahdi will lay the groundwork for a better life for Shia Muslims and 
the world community. Sachedina explains that “the rule of the Mahdi alone will establish 
the era of absolute prosperity which will obtain until the final resurrection takes place and 
the cycle of creation is completed. Al-Mahdi will thus accomplish the return of creation 
to its original purity.”223  As Khamenei’s office proclaimed in a recent tweet, “the entire 
believing mankind is awaiting a savior…The promised Mahdi is not exclusive to 
Shias”224  (See chapter three for Shia doctrinal information about al-Mahdi.)   
B. RELIGIOUS TOOLS 
If the sacred carriers are the means “through which vitally important values are 
sustained and passed, and something true believers are willing to die for,” then the tools 
are complimentary, and become the mechanism for carrying out a potential religious 
action. While the Iranian regime has many tools at its disposal to govern, protect, enforce, 
or propagate its Islamic revolution, the following are highlighted in this analysis because 
they have been used by the Iranian regime in the past to mobilize followers for religious 
reasons, and/or the tool could pose a significant security risk or threat to the United States 
and Israel. Thus, the primary religious tools include, but are not limited to:  1) the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij militia, 2) Hezbollah, 3) martyrdom operations, 4) 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 5) Friday prayers and the mosque, and 
6) mass media, social media and propaganda. 
223 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 178. 
224 https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/477525617559478272 
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1. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij Militia  
For the purposes of this research, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
is similar to a religious toolbox, with its many conventional and asymmetric military 
units that serve to protect the Iranian regime, as well as the elite Qods force, which 
facilitates and conducts external operations worldwide. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the IRGC is the most powerful military and economic organization in Iran. Since 
its purpose is to protect the Iranian regime and the principles of the Islamic revolution, it 
can be assumed that the IRGC leadership will do the bidding of the supreme leader.  
The Iranian constitution clearly establishes, in Article 144, a religious requirement 
for Iran’s armed forces:  “The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an Islamic 
army, i.e., committed to Islamic ideology and the people. It must accept into its service 
deserving individuals who are true to the goals of the Islamic Revolution and devoted to 
realizing them.”225  Moreover, Article 151 requires the government to provide military 
training and facilities for all citizens, in accordance with Islamic criteria, for the defense 
of the Islamic Republic.226  And the same article provides scriptural justification from the 
following Qur’anic verse: “‘Muster against them all the men and cavalry at your 
command, so that you may strike terror into the enemy of God and your enemy and 
others beside them who are unknown to you but known to God’ (8:59).”227 
Another tool that falls under the authority of the IRGC is the Basij Resistance 
Force or militia. As discussed in chapter four, the Basijis are “the eyes and ears of the 
Islamic regime and are considered extremely loyal.”228  The IRGC uses the Basij militia 
as a tool for indoctrinating the people and enforcing Islamic laws in “virtually all sectors 
of Iranian society.”229  
225 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
194. 
226 Ibid., 195. 
227 Ibid. 
228 IHS Jane’s, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Iran, 6. 
229 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, 34, 
63. 
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2. Hezbollah 
Iran is a state sponsor of Hezbollah, a Lebanese-based Shia terrorist organization 
capable of operating worldwide.  (Chapter IV discusses the origins and activities of 
Hezbollah in more detail.)  For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to note that 
Iran’s IRGC-Qods Force was the driving force that created, funded, and trained 
Hezbollah in Lebanon and they continue to have a controlling interest in Hezbollah to 
this day.230  While Hezbollah certainly operates independent of Iran—especially its 
political party—the organization looks to Iran’s Supreme Leader for spiritual guidance 
under the Shia Islamic order.231  Hezbollah’s seeds of identity are deeply rooted in Shia 
Islam and the religion’s manifestation through Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. According 
to Nicholas Blanford, author of Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year 
Struggle Against Israel, new Hezbollah military recruits “absorb the principles of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran, obedience to the wali al-faqih [velayat-e faqih], and enmity 
toward Israel. They are taught religion first, before they ever see a gun.”232  By working 
through its non-state Shia allies, most notably Hezbollah, Iran has developed network of 
surrogates with the capability of conducting attacks or threatening U.S. interests 
worldwide.233   
3. Martyrdom Operations 
As mentioned in Chapter III, Shia Muslims memorialize the themes of victimhood 
and martyrdom through the sacrifice of Husayn on the Day of Ashura. This section 
expands on the narrative of martyrdom intrinsic to Twelver Shi’ism’s history, practices, 
and doctrine. Moojan Momen, author of An Introduction to Shi’I Islam: The History and 
Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism, explains the role of martyrdom and its larger meaning 
within the religion:  
230 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee Hearing: 
Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat, 10. 
231 Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance 
(Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), 124 and 126. 
232 Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel 
(Random House LLC, 2011), Kindle Location 1853. 
233 IHS Jane’s, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Iran, Article #2 Page 4 of 17. 
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The theme of martyrdom and patient suffering is one that is very strong in 
Shi’ism…This theme is embodied in the lives of the Imams themselves 
who are each regarded as having suffered intense persecution…and who 
are all popularly considered to have been martyred (except of course the 
Twelfth Imam…) … and, at each of their anniversaries, their lives are 
recounted emphasizing in particular the wrongs they have suffered at the 
hands of the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid governments.234  
Momen further describes “a strange paradox” in Twelver Shi’ism where the 
Imams were praised for their endurance in suffering through oppression, “yet the greatest 
Shi’i hero, the Imam Husayn, is praised and commended for not submitting to tyranny 
and rising up (qiyamat) and fighting even in the face of overwhelming odds and the 
certainty of martyrdom.”235  This same paradox was evident in contemporary Iran before 
and after the 1979 revolution. For years under the Shah’s reign, the Shia faithful seemed 
to endure the Shah’s dictatorship and his secret police (SAVAK) with patient suffering 
like the Imams of old. Then, through the teachings of secular and religious 
revolutionaries, the fight against oppression and tyranny reached a tipping point. As 
Abbas Milani points out, one of those tipping points may have been the October 1978 
‘ten nights of poetry’ led by secular dissidents (artists and intellectuals) who “read works 
critical of the [Shah’s] regime, its censorship, and its undemocratic ways” to an estimated 
10,000 people in the open air.236  
In the end, however, it was Khomeini’s theory of Islamic government and his use 
of religious narratives, such as martyrdom and sacrifice, which helped spark the final 
events leading to the revolution.  “When the opportunity seems right,” explains Momen, 
“the Shi’i masses can be whipped up to the frenzy of revolution by appeal to the spirit of 
uprising (qiyam) of Husayn. In this state, as was seen in Iran in 1979, the Shi’is are 
prepared to go into the streets unarmed in eager anticipation of martyrdom.”237   
234 Momen, An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism, 236. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Milani, The Shah, 389. 
237 Momen, An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism, 236. 
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4. The Constitution of Iran  
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a religious tool, memorializes 
and establishes Twelver Shi’ism as the official religion, and then articulates how this 
brand of Islamic law and government is to be enacted. It codifies into law some of the 
most important narratives leading up to the 1979 revolution. For example, Article Two 
establishes up front that “the Islamic Republic is a system based on the faith in: One God 
(“There is no god but God”), the exclusive attribution of sovereignty and the legislation 
of law to Him, and the necessity of surrender to His commands.”238  Article Two ends 
with the call to reject or negate “all kinds of oppression, authoritarianism, or the 
acceptance of domination” in order to safeguard the “wondrous and exalted status of 
human beings and their freedom, which must be endowed with responsibility before 
God.”239  
Furthermore, in the preface of Hamid Algar’s translation of the Iranian 
constitution he writes:  “The most important single difference [from Iran’s 1906 
constitution] was the introduction…of the key concept of vilayat-i faqih, ‘the governance 
of the faqih.’  This doctrine, which Imam Khomeini had outlined at length in his 
celebrated lectures…is the keystone of the new political structure, ensuring that the 
Republic will be Islamic in substance and daily functioning as well as designation.”240  
Although the constitution refers to Iran as a “Republic,” in reality it functions as a 
dictatorship where one unelected leader, appointed for life, makes decisions for 
everyone.241 
5. The Friday Prayer 
Friday prayers are held just after noon usually in the town or neighborhood 
mosque. The Friday prayer is a communal prayer, which takes the place of the second of 
238 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
166. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Hamid Algar, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mizan Press Berkeley, 1980), 10. 
241 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 113. 
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the five prayers Muslims offer daily. The call to Friday prayer follows this directive from 
the Qur’an, Sura 62 Al-Jumua’a, 9–10:   
O ye who believe!  When the call is proclaimed to prayer on Friday (the 
Day of Assembly), Hasten earnestly to the Remembrance of Allah, and 
leave off Business (and traffic):  That is best for you if ye but knew! And 
when the Prayer is finished, then may ye disperse through the land, and 
seek of the Bounty of Allah:  and Remember Allah frequently that ye may 
prosper.   
Friday, therefore, represents “the Day of Assembly” for Muslims—the day when 
local clerics give instruction to their communities. In Iran, a collective or communal 
prayer is thought to be much more powerful than when done individually.242  It is not 
uncommon for the Friday prayer message to be coordinated or directed by the religious 
elite and the Supreme Leader. In his book Islamic Government, Khomeini writes:   
The Friday sermon was more than a sura from the Qur’an and a prayer 
followed by a few brief words. Entire armies used to be mobilized by the 
Friday sermon and proceed directly from the mosque to the battlefield—
and a man who sets out from the mosque to go into battle will fear only 
God, not poverty or hardship, and his army will be victorious and 
triumphant. When you look at the Friday sermons given in that age and the 
sermons of the Commander of the Faithful (upon whom be peace), you see 
that their purpose was to set people in motion, to arouse them to fight and 
sacrifice themselves for Islam, to resolve the sufferings of the people of 
this world.243   
Hence, the Friday prayer can and has been used as a religious tool by the Iranian regime 
as a means of influence or control, and to mobilize the masses. The Friday prayer, in 
essence, becomes the weekly stopping point when faithful Muslims assemble, pray, and 
listen to what the ruling religious class in Iran wants them to understand and do.    
6. Mass Media, Social Media, and Propaganda  
Chapter 12, Article 175 of the Iranian constitution establishes:  “The leader 
appoints and removes the head of the mass media of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A 
242 Moghaddam, Private Conversation. 
243 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini; Translated and 
Annotated by Hamid Algar, Kindle Locations 1922–1926. 
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council consisting of representatives of the President of the Republic, the head of the 
judiciary, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly (two persons from each), will supervise 
this organization.”244 The same article directs that “freedom of expression and 
dissemination of ideas must be granted through the mass media…with due observance of 
Islamic criteria and the welfare of the country.”245  Iran’s record of freedom of the press, 
however, has been anything but free. The clause “with due observance of Islamic criteria 
and the welfare of the country” undoubtedly grants the ruling elite license to censure, 
restrict, and imprison opposing voices. The World Press Freedom Index 2014 listed Iran 
as 173rd on the negativity scale out of 180 countries in terms of freedom of the press.246  
Despite Rouhani’s campaign promises to release political prisoners and promote speech 
and media freedom, Reporters Without Borders claims that at least 10 journalists and 
bloggers have been arrested since Rouhani’s election victory, “10 others have been 
sentenced to a combined total of 72 years…and three newspapers have been closed or 
forced to suspend publishing under pressure from the authorities.”247 
The ruling religious class in the Islamic Republic has essentially cleared the 
airwaves for the regime’s preferred discourse by restricting the press, and banning access 
to YouTube and social media sites. While up to 30% of Iranians reportedly circumvent 
Internet filters by using virtual private networks (VPNs) connected to foreign servers 
(and many have their own Facebook accounts), the regime controls the majority of the 
media and propaganda bandwidth within Iran’s borders.248  The media, in all its forms, 
therefore, is a tool at the regime’s disposal—to use politically, religiously, or 
philosophically as the regime sees fit.    
244 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
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Despite their own ban on social media, the supreme leader and other government 
officials use multiple social media platforms—mostly in English and Arabic—to 
broadcast a specific message outside Iran’s borders. According to a U.S. Institute of 
Peace report, “the supreme leader’s social media appears aimed primarily at a regional 
and international audience…On each site, Khamenei’s primary message is that the 
Islamic Republic is a rising power in the region and that its ideology has growing 
influence. He credits Iran for inspiring the Arab uprisings as part of a wider ‘Islamic 
awakening’ that imitates the 1979 revolution.”249  The leadership’s social media, 
therefore, is another tool the regime uses to influence English and Arabic speaking 
audiences—primarily outside Iran’s borders.  
C. THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE: EXAMPLES OF RELIGIOUS-
BASED AGGRESSION   
The following paragraphs examine how the sacred carriers and tools can be 
combined—within the framework of the contextual narratives—as religious options to 
target the United States and its interests. These three assessments are supported by 
historical precedent, by Islamic doctrine or law, or through the correlation of primary 
source material found in the research. 
1. The Past—The Iran–Iraq War 
The Iran–Iraq War contains many of the religious narratives and sacred carriers 
and tools previously outlined in this chapter. Khomeini, as the supreme leader and sacred 
carrier, effectively framed the Iran–Iraq War as a religious war—a battle between good 
and evil, a war against the oppressive American superpower and a corrupt Sunni regime. 
It was the first military test for the new Islamic Republic under the leadership of 
Khomeini, and, in a sense, it helped bring solidarity to a fledgling Islamic state. Vali 
Nasr, author of The Shia Revival, remarked: “The more demanding the war became, the 
more the regime depicted it as the battle of good and evil—of the Twelfth Imam versus 
his enemies. The fervor bred a cult of martyrdom in the populace and made sacrifice for 
249 Ibid. 
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the faith a central feature of revolutionary Shia politics.”  The Iranian nation, under an 
Islamic Republic banner assumed a collective religious identity.  
Although the war was started by Iraq, and led by a Sunni dictator in Saddam 
Hussein, Khomeini focused on America’s support of Saddam Hussein as a way to 
galvanize anger against the United States. In a September 1980 speech, Khomeini 
exclaimed:   
Iran has tried to sever all its relations with this Great Satan [America] and 
it is for this reason that it now finds wars imposed upon it. America has 
urged Iraq to spill the blood of our young men…Let the Muslim nations 
be aware that Iran is a country effectively at war with America, and that 
our martyrs—the brave young men of our army and the Revolutionary 
Guards—are defending Iran and the Islam we hold dear against 
America.250   
Moreover, as part of the context surrounding the start of the war, the American Embassy 
hostages in Tehran were still in captivity (until January 1981). Remembering the CIA’s 
successful coup to overthrow Iran’s government in 1953, Iranians viewed the United 
States with extreme suspicion and had labeled the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the “The Den 
of Spies.”  
The Iran–Iraq War was, in a sense, a modern version of the Battle of Karbala in 
680 AD where Imam Husayn, representing the Shia (Iran), fought for justice against the 
Umayyad Caliphate, representing Sunni Islam (Iraq). The story of Karbala, especially 
remembered on the Day of Ashura, functioned as a sacred carrier to mobilize thousands 
to become martyrs for the war. Additionally, the Friday prayer was used as a tool to 
recruit volunteers, especially from the smaller, un-educated and rural villages. The Friday 
prayer leaders, according to Ray Takeyh, “routinely used their sermons to suggest that 
God had offered Iranians such an unsavory foe to vanquish in order for them to claim a 
special place in his kingdom.”251  As the religious leaders proclaimed that martyrdom 
guaranteed a place in heaven, the “human wave” martyrdom attacks became one of 
250 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini; Translated and 
Annotated by Hamid Algar, Kindle Locations 4466–4470. 
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primary strategies to offset the superior Iraqi conventional ground forces.252  Martyrs 
from the Iran–Iraq War to this day are remembered and celebrated in Iran. To illustrate 
how the theme of martyrdom continues to be propagated in modern-day Iran, the 
Supreme Leader’s office recently tweeted an image of a mother kissing her son as he 
prepares for possible martyrdom in the Iran–Iraq War. The infographic, shown in Figure 
5, attributes the following caption to Ayatollah Khamenei: “Iranian Mothers coupled with 
the utmost of their feminine emotions and compassion with a spirit of martyrdom and 
resistance against the invaders.”253 
 
Figure 5.  Khamenei Tweet: “Iranian Mothers” 
252 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, Kindle Location 1634. 
253 https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/486143967067897856/photo/1, July 7, 2014 
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Additionally, the sacred carrier notion of al-Mahdi, and his reappearance, played a 
part in encouraging would-be martyrs. Nasr, recounts how common soldiers, “peasant 
boys raised in an atmosphere of simple piety,” would each receive a “plastic key 
representing the key to the gates of paradise. Many nights during the war, Iranian soldiers 
would wake up to see a white-shrouded figure on a white horse blessing them. These 
apparitions of the “Twelfth Imam” were professional actors sent to boost morale.”254  
The volunteer soldiers, according to Nasr, “were sentinels of the Twelfth Imam, and to 
them the war was a spiritual as well as a physical fight.”255  
Moreover, the war afforded Khomeini the opportunity to build and strengthen the 
IRGC—a parallel military to the already established, but less trusted Iranian armed forces 
(the Artesh) which carried over from the Shah’s military.256  The IRGC eventually took 
the lead in fighting the Iraqis and, according to Alireza Nader, “the Guards’ role in Iran’s 
so-called ‘holy-defense’ against Iraq has been used over the years to burnish their 
credentials as defender of the revolution and the nation.”257  
Although the Khomeini regime branded the Iran–Iraq War as a religious battle, it 
was also compelled to rely on nationalism, especially early on, to mobilize support for the 
war effort. Amid the uncertainty and confusion of war, “a nationalist revival swept 
Tehran and the rest of the country. People of very different persuasions, many of whom 
had been fighting one another in the postrevolution era, banded together to fight the Iraqi 
invaders.”258  Moghaddam points out that in situations where societies experience serious 
political and economic uncertainty or a threat, they “turn to a savior who they hope will 
lead them out of the crisis.”259  Such was the case with the Iranian people and Khomeini. 
The external threat from Iraq served to galvanize support for Khomeini’s dictatorial 
regime and, as a result, “the central government became a stronger and far more 
254 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, Kindle Locations 
1624–1629. 
255 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1633–1634. 
256 Nader, “The Revolutionary Guards.” 
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258 Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship, 64. 
259 Ibid., 65. 
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expansive and intrusive force in society.260  Over time, as opposition voices were 
silenced, the regime could depend more fully upon the growing strength of the IRGC and 
Basij militia, along with Friday Prayers where the religious narratives and obligations 
could spread more easily to the masses.   
While the contemporary Iran of today, 35 years after the revolution, is not the 
same politically and demographically as Khomeini’s Iran of the 1980s, the sacred carriers 
continue to be relevant and many of the religious tools have been upgraded. The 
implications of how the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran utilized these sacred 
carriers and religious tools in the Iran–Iraq War perhaps foreshadows how Iran could 
fight a war in the future. Furthermore, the anti-American narrative was, and still is, 
essential in protecting the regime. As Moghaddam explains, “those who wonder why the 
clerics in Iran insist on whipping up anti-American sentiments and organizing and 
leading rallies against the United States…should keep in mind that without the ‘Great 
Satan’ to fight against, the regime in Tehran would collapse more quickly.”261  This type 
of displaced aggression serves to keep the regime in control.262  
2. The Present—An Asymmetric War 
Iran’s religious tools today—especially the IRGC, Hezbollah, and mass and social 
media—are much more robust and potentially more powerful than they were in the 
1980s. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the IRGC gained a strong economic foothold in Iran 
following the Iran–Iraq War. Moreover, during the Iran–Iraq War, the IRGC Qods Force 
helped form and train its Lebanese-based Hezbollah proxy terrorist group. The Qods 
Force and Hezbollah now operate globally, and both organizations feature a cadre of 
experienced war-hardened veterans in the senior command ranks.263  Given the current 
260 Ibid., 64. 
261 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to 
Destroy, Kindle Location 1197. 
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symbiotic relationship between the supreme leader and the IRGC, their influence over 
Hezbollah, and their control over Iran’s economic lifeline—the oil and gas industry—
they are well-positioned to conduct low intensity, asymmetric warfare against the United 
States and Israel.     
Iran’s asymmetric warfare doctrine is both defensive and offensive in nature. 
Sourcing his own 2012 interviews with Israeli Intelligence officials, Hezbollah expert 
Matthew Levitt writes in his book Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party 
of God, that in 2010, “Hezbollah engaged in detailed talks with Iranian officials to lay out 
Hezbollah’s role in Iran’s larger plan for a coordinated shadow war targeting Israeli, 
American, British, and Gulf state interests.”264  Levitt explains that, in addition to 
conducting revenge operations against Israeli targets, another primary goal was to 
establish “a deterrent threat by convincing Western powers that an attack on Iran would 
result in—among other things—asymmetric terrorist attacks worldwide.”265  Most 
recently, the Qods Force—with possible help from Hezbollah—is believed to be behind 
the 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador via a mass casualty attack in 
Washington, DC.266  With the Qods Force and Hezbollah, therefore, already engaged in a 
shadow war against the U.S. and Israel, the following paragraphs establish how the 
sacred carriers and additional religious tools emerge into the larger narrative germane to 
this thesis.     
Khamenei and the ruling clergy in Iran—after more than 35 years since the 
revolution—continue to perceive the U.S. and Israel as enemies and direct threats to the 
tenets of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei, like his predecessor, consistently engages in 
anti-American and anti-Zionist rhetoric as foundational talking point in his speeches. 
Regarding Israel, for example, Khamenei’s official website promotes his views on the 
“Survival of Palestine and the annihilation of Israel:”   
264 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown 
University Press, 2013), 361. 
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266 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee Hearing: 
Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat, 4. 
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Today the leaders of the usurping Zionist regime and their American 
supporter—who are foolishly giving them unconditional support—are 
trying to erase the name of Palestine from history and from the minds of 
the world’s people…They will not be able to annihilate the name of 
Palestine. It is the Zionists who will disappear from the face of the earth 
and from history. But Palestine and the Palestinian nation will stay…By 
Allah’s favor, Palestine’s flag will be raised by the faithful Palestinian and 
Lebanese youth.267 
A primary religious duty of all Muslims, Sunni or Shia, is to come to the defense 
of fellow Muslims—especially when infidels or non-believers occupy their land. 
According to Khamenei “the issue of Palestine is a crucial issue for all Muslims. All Shia 
and Sunni scholars have explicitly stated that if a part of Muslim territories is occupied 
by the enemies of Islam, it will be every Muslim’s duty to fight in order to restore the lost 
piece of land.”268 
Iran’s hardliners see the conflict against Israel not only as a duty, but also as a 
religious trigger for action. Under the direction of the IRGC Qods Force, both Hezbollah 
and Hamas, have received weapons to aid in their resistance to the “Zionist” regime. 
Indeed, many of the rockets fired by Hamas into Israel today likely come from Iran. In 
early March 2014, for example, Israel announced that it had intercepted an Iranian 
shipment of surface-to-surface rockets “bound for ‘terrorist organizations’ operating in 
Gaza.”269  As the IRGC hardliners continue to gain power and influence in Iran, they will 
likely use religion to mobilize more supporters, inside and outside Iran, to fight with Hamas 
to remove the Zionist regime and restore the Palestinian people to their land. Iran’s Basij 
force commander stated in February 2014, “The enemies must know today that the Basijis 
are continuously ready and are counting down the time when the order of liberating 
Jerusalem is issued.”270  This statement, while certainly part of Iran’s propaganda 
campaign to project power in the region, reflects the hardliner view from within Iran.  




269 Saad Abedine and Michael Schwartz, “Israel Intercepts Ship with Weapons Headed to Gaza,” 
CNN, March 6, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/05/world/meast/israel-intercepted-weapons/index.html. 
270 “Iran News Round Up February 28, 2014,” accessed August 10, 2014, 
http://www.irantracker.org/iran-news-round-february-28-2014. 
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In other examples, Khamenei uses social media extensively in English and Arabic 
as a means to shape the Iranian discourse against America and Israel. Many of 
Khamenei’s tweets are, in fact, small snippets from his speeches. According to 
Khamenei’s official Twitter account on March 20, 2014, the Supreme Leader’s most 
important quote of 2013, as show in Figure 6, was tweeted as the following infographic:  
“If the Zionist regime makes a wrong move, Iran will raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the 
ground.”271  This rhetorical “threat” from Khamenei is likely a response to Israel’s 
repeated warning that it would “strike” Iran should it develop a nuclear weapon. 
 
Figure 6.  Khamenei Tweet: “If the Zionist Regime Makes a Wrong Move” 
271 https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/446635543258886144, March 20, 2014. 
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On July 26, 2014, during Israel’s military campaign against Hamas in Gaza, 
Khamenei’s office tweeted “Why should & how can Israel be eliminated? Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s answer to 9 key questions abt [sic] elimination of #Israel.”272   The tweet 
had an accompanying infographic with the nine key questions (shown in Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7.  Khamenei’s “9 Key Questions About the Elimination of Israel” 
272 https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/493008303384199168, July 26, 2014. 
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Notably, in Khamenei’s “9 key questions about elimination of Israel” (Figure 7), 
he clarifies what is meant by the elimination of Israel from the viewpoint of his 
predecessor, Imam Khomeini:  “And of course the elimination of Israel does not mean 
the massacre of the Jewish people in this region” (point two). Rather, Khamenei calls for 
all the “original people of Palestine including Muslims, Christians and Jews” to take part 
in a public referendum; however, the “Jewish immigrants who have been persuaded into 
emigration to Palestine do not have the right to take part in this referendum” (point three). 
This is Khamenei’s “proper way of eliminating Israel.” 
 Furthermore, as part of this nine-point declaration, Khamenei infers that the 
“Zionists” will not “easily surrender to this proposal,” therefore, he states, “the only 
means of confronting a regime which commits crimes beyond one’s thought and 
imagination is a resolute and armed confrontation” (points five and six). This statement 
supports the idea of an asymmetric war with Hamas and Hezbollah fighting against 
Israel. And in point eight, Khamenei clarifies that Iran recommends “neither a classical 
war by the army of Muslim countries”—meaning the Muslim countries (including Iran) 
cannot defeat Israel’s conventional military. As a result, Khamenei emphatically endorses 
a lower level of “armed resistance” with no compromises—“peace,’” he states “is simply 
a trick for more crimes and occupation” (point nine).   
Continuing with Israel as a primary target of Iran’s resistance, martyrdom also 
emerges an important religious tool and tactic within the larger asymmetric war effort. 
Hezbollah, as part of its resistance against Israel for example, discusses martyrdom 
openly. Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary Sheikh Naim Qassem, in an interview with 
Nicholas Blanford, discusses the “exceptional particularity” of Hezbollah’s fighters and 
their willingness to sacrifice themselves as martyrs:  “First, [it is] faith in Islam and what 
this means in connection with God, the exalted, and attaining a moral state that gives one 
self-confidence, strength, hope for the future, readiness to sacrifice [oneself]…This is 
something essential that we have.273  The second component, described by Blanford in 
his interview with Qassem is:  
273 Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel, Kindle 
Locations 2121–2127. 
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“readiness for martyrdom” and an understanding that “martyrdom neither 
shortens nor prolongs life because the timing of death is predestined by 
God.… Since the outcome of this martyrdom is a divine reward in 
Heaven, this is something quite important when it comes to mobilization, 
especially that we have historic leaders who have presented this example, 
such as the Prophet Mohammed, Imam Ali, and Imam Hussein and 
others.”274   
As noted by Qassem, the sacred carrier of Ashura and its commemoration of the sacrifice 
of Husayn, contributes to Hezbollah’s the culture of martyrdom.  
Hezbollah forced an Israeli withdrawal of Lebanon in 1985 by combining terrorist 
tactics, martyrdom operations, and guerilla warfare against a far superior Israeli 
conventional force. This initial victory also had broader implications in the region. 
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, for example, looked to Hezbollah’s success and 
religious justification in the use of suicide tactics in their struggles against Israel.275  
Decades later, leading up to the 2006 Lebanon War, Iran (and to some extent Syria) 
helped transform Hezbollah into a “hybrid” fighting force that learned how to employ 
both conventional and irregular tactics in a single battlespace.276  Speaking about the 
future, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey remarked in May 2009 
that the conflict that intrigued him the most, and that “speaks more toward what we can 
expect in the decades ahead, is the one that happened in Lebanon in the summer of 
2006.”277   
According to Blanford, Hezbollah believes the next war with Israel will “mark the 
beginning of the end of Israel.”278  In the aftermath of the 34-day Israel-Hezbollah War 
in 2006, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, delivered a series of speeches 
promising Israel a “big surprise that could change the course of the war and the fate of 
the region,” and in 2008, he proclaimed that Israel would be eliminated from existence 
274 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2121–2127. 
275 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 2013), Kindle Locations 3386–
3391. 
276 Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel, Kindle 
Location 6812. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid., Kindle Location 7598. 
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“because this is a historical and divine law from which there is no escape. This is 
definite.”279    
A progressively overt asymmetric war against America or Israel, therefore, 
becomes a useful way to displace aggression and build support for the regime—
especially at a time when Khamenei and the religious ruling class struggle to balance 
political, economic, and religious power to preserve the Islamic Revolution.   
Furthermore, Iran’s conventional military power had limited success in projecting power 
during the Iran–Iraq War, but has since found success in creating resistance 
movements—especially the Lebanese Hezbollah—to fight low intensity conflicts across 
the Middle East.280  This unconventional approach “has left a greater imprint on Iranian 
military interventions due to its relative military success, cost-effectiveness, and 
deniability.”281  
3. The Future—the Belief in the Mahdi’s Reappearance 
Article Five of the Iranian constitution declares that “During the absence (ghayba) 
of his holiness, the Lord of the Age, May God all mighty hasten his appearance, the 
sovereignty of the command [of God] and religious leadership of the community [of 
believers] in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the responsibility of the faqih [the 
Leader].”282  The Iranian constitution acknowledges and calls for the hastening of the 
return of the “Lord of the Age”—another name for the Hidden Imam—and writes into 
law that the supreme leader is in charge until his reappearance. Although Khomeini used 
the narrative and doctrine of the Mahdi’s return as a fundamental principle in his theory 
of Islamic government, he was more of pragmatist than a millennialist. According to 
Amanat, Khomeini “rejected the idea that the ‘ulama [religious scholars] could wage holy 
war in the Imam’s absence, though he did look forward ultimately to an ‘Islamic World 
279 Ibid. 
280 Farzan Sabet, “Military Intervention, Iranian-Style,” War on the Rocks, June 30, 2014, 
http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/military-intervention-iranian-style/. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
167–168. 
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Government’ which would come into being with advent of the Imam.”283  For Khomeini, 
then, and many others in the current Iranian regime, one must assume that the awaited 
Mahdi’s return is not a matter of urgency.284  That is except for Iran’s former hardliner 
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who seemed to be at the forefront of Iran’s recent 
messianic resurgence.  
In a 2012 article featured in the Hudson Institute’s Current Trends in Islamist 
Ideology journal, Dr. Bernd Kaussler stated, “In recent years, the Islamic Republic has 
experienced a country-wide resurgence in messianic activity and rhetoric that, in terms its 
sheer volume and intensity, has not been seen since the revolutionary era over thirty years 
ago.”285  Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, through his speeches and actions, was one of the 
primary leaders of this messianic movement. In 2005, Ahmadinejad allocated roughly 
$17 million to renovate the Jamkaran mosque (near the religious city of Qom, Iran) 
where, according to Shiite tradition, the Mahdi will one day ascend.286  Ahmadinejad’s 
numerous UNGA speeches, as evidenced by the following quote, referenced the Hidden 
Imam in poetic-like form:  “The era of darkness will end, prisoners will return home, the 
occupied lands will be freed, Palestine and Iraq will be liberated from the dominion of the 
occupiers…Without any doubt, the Promised One [the Mahdi] who is the ultimate Savior 
will come…he will establish a bright future and fill the world with justice and beauty.”287 
Although Ahmadinejad’s messianic fervor garnered support from within the 
senior Ayatollah ranks—namely from his mentor, Ayatollah Mesbah-e Yazdi, and from 
Ayatollah Jannati, chairman of the Guardian Council—many senior clerics were 
staunchly opposed to his politicization of the doctrine of Mahdism.288  A 2008 Middle 
East Quarterly article titled, “Ahmadinejad and the Mahdi,” states that “the president’s 
283 Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism, 306. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Kaussler, “Is The End Nigh for the Islamic Republic?,” 71. 
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Mahdism has severe repercussions for the clerical basis of the Islamic Republic. 
Incumbent in the belief in the Mahdi’s return is the notion that he will be opposed by the 
clergy.”289  The article further explains that Ahmadinejad’s efforts have already 
encouraged “a class of lay clerics (maddah) much more in tune with his folk belief than 
formal Shi’i theology. They staunchly supported Ahmadinejad and promote Mahdism, 
recalling dreams about and sightings of the Mahdi.”290  Furthermore, since Ahmadinejad 
became president, hundreds of websites and blogs have emerged that support the former 
president’s view of Mahdism.291   All that being said, Ahmadinejad is no longer 
president, and his successor, Hassan Rouhani, has had little to say about the subject. 
What, then, do the works of Supreme Leader Khamenei say about the doctrine of 
Mahdism, and what does the sacred carrier concept of the Hidden Imam mean in terms of 
a future conflict with the United States or Israel?   
According to the constitution, Khamenei, as supreme leader, is functioning as the 
principal deputy to the Hidden Imam. He therefore routinely pays homage in his speeches 
to his doctrinal superior. He often concludes a speech by saying something to the effect 
of: “God willing, these efforts will be rewarded by Imam Mahdi (may our souls be 
sacrificed for his sake),”292 or “I hope that He [God] will make the holy heart of the 
Imam of the Age (may our souls be sacrificed for his sake) pleased with us.”293   In 
perhaps his strongest endorsement of the doctrine of Mahdism, Khamenei delivered a 
speech in 2008 marking Imam Mahdi’s birth anniversary. In this speech, Khamenei 
expounds on messianic doctrine and discusses what it means to wait for the Mahdi:  
Waiting for the arrival of Imam Mahdi does not mean that we should 
remain idle and not make any efforts to improve…What does waiting for 
the savior mean? It means waiting for the strong, powerful and divine 
hand of Imam Mahdi to put an end to the domination of the oppressive 
289 Ahdiyyih, “Ahmadinejad and the Mahdi.” 
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powers with the help of humans, to bring justice to the world, to raise the 
flag of monotheism, and to lead humans to worshipping God. We should 
get prepared for this. The formation of the Islamic Republic prepared the 
ground for this great and historic movement. Everything that is done to 
achieve justice in the world takes us one step forward towards reaching 
this lofty goal.294 
In a more recent event, June 6, 2014, Khamenei met with the director and researchers of 
Iran’s Dar-ul Hadith Research Institute and was presented an encyclopedia of Mahdaviat 
(about the Mahdi). Khamenei remarked that the encyclopedia is “a good example of 
identifying the shortcomings in this field of research,” and further stated:  “The issue of 
Mahdaviat and the re-appearance of the Imam of the Age (may God hasten his re-
appearance) is God’s definite promise.”295 
The religious tools of mass media and social media have also played a significant 
role in perpetuating the idea of the Mahdi’s return. Ahmadinejad’s administration 
purportedly assisted in making a 2011 documentary film titled “The Coming is Near,” 
which depicts “Iran as the epicenter of a globalizing messianic movement that was 
sweeping across the Middle East and preparing the way for the Mahdi.”296  The film 
likens President Ahmadinejad to Soheib ibn Soheib, “the Hidden Imam’s right-hand man 
who is said to conquer Jerusalem in preparation for the Mahdi’s return” and Supreme 
Leader Khamenei as being similar to Seyyed Khorosani, “who has been prophesied to be 
victorious in the intense wars that will take place before the [Mahdi’s] Coming.”297  
On the days leading up to the Mahdi’s 2014 birth anniversary, mid-June 2014 (the 
15 of Sha’ban in the Islamic calendar)—Khamenei’s office released a series of tweets 
about “The Promised Mahdi.”  For example, a June 12 tweet exclaimed the following 
using the vernacular of social media: “Characteristic of Promised #Mahdi is that thru 
294 Ali Khamenei, “Supreme Leader’s Speech on the Occasion of Imam Mahdi’s Birth Anniversary,” 
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him, God fills earth w/#justice & fairness while b4 him, it’d been filled w/injustice 
&tyranny.”298  In another tweet on June 13, the Supreme Leader’s office included a 
colorful infographic affirming that “The entire believing mankind is awaiting a savior (as 
seen in Figure 8).”299 
 
Figure 8.  Khamenei Tweet: “The Promised Mahdi” 
298 https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/477021279124717568, June 12, 2014. 
299 https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/477525617559478272, June 13, 2014. 
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 It is evident, therefore, that the doctrine of Mahdism, is still being promoted in 
Iran and to the world, albeit without the same zeal and frequency that Ahmadinejad 
endorsed. Khamenei, with his validation of Rouhani as Iran’s new president in 2013, is 
likely trying to soften the regime’s hardliner (and messianic) reputation. However, with a 
an active messianic movement Iran, and the proliferation of Internet media supporting 
Mahdism, Khamenei and his inner circle will find it increasingly difficult to balance the 
messianic doctrine of the Hidden Imam—upon which Twelver Shi’ism is based—with 
the need for pragmatism. Mohebat Ahdiyyih calls it a “Pandora’s box for the traditional 
clerics and the Islamic Republic as an increasing number of people learn about the issue 
[of Mahdism].”300 
 Perhaps it would be the IRGC, then, that perpetuates or diminishes this sacred 
carrier belief in the Mahdi’s promised reappearance. As the Iranian constitution states, 
“The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an Islamic army… committed to 
Islamic ideology and the people.”301  In theory, would not the IRGC and its Basij 
volunteer force become the Mahdi’s army?  
 In an August 2012 Friday prayer speech in Tehran, Ali Sa’idi, Khamenei’s 
representative to the IRGC, proclaimed:  “The main burden of preparing the ground for 
the advent of the Imam of the Age rests on Khamenei, the Iranian people and the IRGC… 
The Basij plays a role… The advent of the Imam of the Age requires 100 million self-
sacrificing IRGC members and Basijis.”302  Could this be why the regime is limiting 
birth control with the intent to double the country’s population to 150 million?  Indeed, 
there are many reasons why Iran wants to increase its birthrate, many of which were 
outlined in Chapter IV. One answer is that dictatorships need manpower. They need 
impressionable youth that can be indoctrinated to the regime’s ideology and fill the ranks 
of the Basij militia. Jane’s most recent assessment on Iran describes the Basij youth 
300 Ahdiyyih, “Ahmadinejad and the Mahdi.” 
301 Firoozeh Papan-Matin (trans.), “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” 
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movement as similar “to the ‘young pioneers’ and ‘komosol’ of the Soviet Union; 
essentially a mass youth movement that included mostly children and helped encourage 
regime support at a young age.”303 
In summary, this purpose of this chapter, and indeed, this thesis is to uncover the 
religious narratives—and within these narratives, the sacred carriers and religious tools 
the Iranian regime could use against the United States in a low or high intensity conflict. 
The above analysis highlights how religion shapes Iran’s actions through past, present, 
and future aggressive scenarios, giving U.S. policymakers and analysts deeper insights 
into a theocratic dictatorship that has, more often than not, puzzled Western observers for 
more than 35 years. Indeed, by understanding Iran’s sacred carriers and religious tools, 
U.S. policymakers and government analysts will perhaps be able to more effectively 
deconstruct the religious elements that influence Iran, recognize what the regime may be 
trying to accomplish, and the tools it will use to achieve its objectives. The final, 
concluding, chapter goes one step further and recommends a framework for United States 
and Western analysts to view and understand Iran.  
  
303 IHS Jane’s, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Iran, Article #11 Page 7 of 10. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Using a grounded theory approach, this research project explored and surveyed 
numerous primary source documents from Iran’s most influential contemporary leaders. 
The goal was to answer the research question:  What sacred carriers and religious tools 
could the Iranian regime use to mobilize or launch attacks against United States interests 
at home or abroad?  The findings revealed three major narratives that are central to the 
self-preservation of the Iranian regime: 1) establishing a government representing true or 
pure Islam; 2) protecting the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Revolution; and 3) fighting 
oppression and imperialism. Each or these narratives contain religious subthemes and 
topics, all of which provide some degree of context and meaning to the regime’s actions 
and words. Within the framework of these narratives, the previous chapter examined 
Iran’s most prominent sacred carriers and religious tools—the enabling factors the regime 
could use to mobilize against or attack the United States. This final chapter discusses the 
project’s conclusions and suggests a conceptual framework for analyzing the Iranian 
regime. It also offers recommendations for further research.  
A. PROJECT CONCLUSIONS 
The findings and subsequent analyses from this research project do not suggest 
that the Iranian religious elite would sacrifice the regime’s existence for an “all out” 
apocalyptic, or purely religious war. For the most part, Iran will act as a pragmatic 
nation-state as it seeks to improve its economy, exploit its natural resources, and shore up 
its armed forces to defend the country and protect the regime. Most experts and scholars 
agree, however, that Iran’s decision-making process is extremely complex and, more 
often than not, unpredictable. Ray Takeyh describes Iran’s foreign policy as a “matrix 
with three competing elements—Islamic ideology, national interests, and factional 
politics—all constantly at battle. As such, Iran’s policy has always been characterized by 
a degree of inconsistency and wild oscillation between pragmatism and dogma.”304   
304 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 
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The findings and analyses do indicate, however, that Iran would utilize the power 
of its sacred carriers and religious tools to complement an asymmetric war against the 
United States or to mobilize forces for a larger campaign or war, if needed. Indeed, the 
evidence examined in the previous chapter supports the concept that Iran is using, and 
will continue to use religious tools as part of a low profile, asymmetric war against the 
United States and Israel. 
Furthermore, the findings show the regime’s prolific use of social media—a tool 
the Supreme Leader uses, in part, to propagate religious ideology to a regional and 
worldwide audience. Khamenei’s Twitter feed, for example, has been actively 
denigrating Israel, and promoting the cause of the Palestinians during Israel’s 2014 
conflict with Hamas in Gaza. In Will Fulton’s 2013 article titled, “IRGC Messaging: 
Insight into a Revolutionary Regime,” he explains that “Iran perceives itself to be 
actively engaged in conflict with Israel and the West, and Iran’s response to this 
perception has been, in part, to mount an aggressive messaging campaign aimed at 
deterring its enemies, assuring a domestic audience, and supporting its claims of regional 
dominance.”305  Fulton astutely recognizes that “Rhetoric, of course, does not equal 
intent, nor does it reflect reality.”306   
Understanding Iran’s true intent and whether or not it reflects reality is a difficult, 
if not impossible task. There are no clear ‘cause and effect’ markers that can predict, with 
a high degree of accuracy, Iran’s next moves that are of consequence to the United States. 
However, as this thesis demonstrates and suggests, the religious tools and sacred carriers 
could be thought of as markers (or signs) within the context of Iran’s larger religious 
narratives. In essence, the markers and narratives can help provide the context behind the 
rhetoric, and give meaning to action. Moghaddam describes Islamic societies as “‘living 
history’ societies, in that they tend to look to narratives about the past than the future for 
inspiration and guidance.”307  The religious aspect of Iran—as it relates to aggression 
305 Will Fulton, “IRGC Messaging: Insight into a Revolutionary Regime,” May 20, 2013, 
http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/fulton-irgc-messaging-insight-revolutionary-regime-may-20-2013. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to 
Destroy, Kindle Locations 757–758. 
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against the United States—therefore, needs to be understood through a framework that 
examines patterns of narratives “about the past” and religious markers in order to make 
sense of a complex environment. The following section suggests such a framework—one 
that will, perhaps, provide an alternate way to understand how Iran’s Islamic ideology 
influences its decision-making process. 
B. USING THE CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND IRAN 
David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone developed the Cynefin framework 
(pronounced ku-nev-in308) in the late 1990s to help executives “see things from new 
viewpoints, assimilate complex concepts, and address real-world problems and 
opportunities.”309  Based on complexity science, the Cynefin framework helps users 
make sense of chaotic, complex, and ordered systems—with the ordered system further 
divided into simple and complicated (see Figure 9). In ordered systems “the relationship 
between cause and effect exists, it is predictable, [and] it can be determined in 
advance.”310  In the complex and chaotic unordered systems, there is no causality, hence 
the need to allow patterns to emerge whereby one can make sense of the data and then 
respond accordingly.311  Similar to this thesis, the complex and chaotic systems are 
exploratory—a “sense-making model,” where data precedes the framework.312  Of the 
five systems explained by Snowden and Boone in the Cynefin framework, the complex 
domain best describes the Islamic Republic of Iran.    
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the Rand Corporation concluded in its 2010 research 
project that “one of the attributes of Iranian elite dynamics is the fact that the rules of the 
game are constantly in flux and are nowhere codified.”313  Hence, identifying cause and 
308 According to David Snowden and Mary Boone, “Cynefin is a Welsh word that signifies the 
multiple factors in our environment and our experience that influence us in ways we can never understand.” 
This definition is found in page 2 of the source document is listed in footnote 6. 
309 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 1–2. 
310 The Cynefin Framework, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7oz366X0-
8&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
311 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 4. 
312 The Cynefin Framework. 
313 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, 
Preface. 
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effect relationships and predicting Iran’s future moves are especially difficult, if not 
impossible most of the time. In the Cynefin framework’s complex domain, the analyst or 
leader “can understand why things happen only in retrospect,” and “must patiently allow 
the path forward to reveal itself. They need to probe first, then sense, and then 
respond.”314  Therefore, by examining religious patterns, narratives and markers (if the 
scenario fits) within the complex system, and then applying the framework’s 
corresponding decision-making strategy, U.S. policymakers and analysts might more 
accurately make sense of Iran’s complex scenarios—and make better decisions vis-à-vis 
Iran. Tables 2 and 3, adapted from Snowden and Boone’s Harvard Business Review 
article, describe the characteristics of a complex system, as well as its corresponding 
decision-making strategy. 
 
 Understanding Complexity in the Cynefin Framework 
• It involves large numbers of interacting elements. 
• The interactions are nonlinear, and minor changes can produce disproportionately major 
consequences. 
• The system is dynamic, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and solutions can’t be 
imposed; rather, they arise from the circumstances. This is frequently referred to as 
emergence. 
• The system has a history, and the past is integrated with the present; the elements evolve with 
one another and with the environment; and evolution is irreversible. 
• Though a complex system may, in retrospect, appear to be ordered and predictable, hindsight 
does not lead to foresight because the external conditions and systems constantly change. 
• Unlike in ordered systems (where the system constrains the agents), or chaotic systems 
(where there are no constraints), in a complex system the agents and the system constrain one 
another, especially over time. This means that we cannot forecast or predict what will 
happen. 
Table 2.   Understanding Complexity in the Cynefin Framework315 
  
314 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 5. 
315 Ibid., 3. 
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The Complexity Decision-Making Strategy 
• Probe, sense, respond 
• Create environments and experiments that allow patterns to emerge 
• Increase levels of interaction and communication 
• Use methods that can help generate ideas: Open up discussion (as through large group 
methods); set barriers; stimulate attractors; encourage dissent and diversity; and manage 
starting conditions and monitor for emergence 
Table 3.   The Complexity Decision-Making Strategy316 
The complexity decision-making model will not always apply to Iran—it is not a 
one-size-fits-all application. In some scenarios there will be order and predictability, and 
at other times chaos or disorder might prevail. The key objective, therefore, is to identify 
the correct system in which to make decisions. While there is much more to the Cynefin 
framework than has been described in these few paragraphs, the important takeaway is 
that the model is flexible—it allows one to “think differently and act differently” 
depending on the identified system or domain.317  An excellent source to understand the 
Cynefin framework at the basic level is Snowden and Boone’s article, “A Leader’s 
Framework for Decision Making,” in the November 2007 Harvard Business Review. 
Another resource is David Snowden’s Cognitive Edge Network YouTube channel that 








316 Ibid., 7. 
317 The Cynefin Framework. 
318 “Cognitive Edge - YouTube,” accessed August 1, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/user/CognitiveEdge/about. 
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Figure 9.  The Cynefin Framework.319 
In a very insightful January 2014 article titled, “The Middle East as an 
Intelligence Challenge,” Ephraim Kam, a former Israeli Defense Force colonel, discusses 
the reasons why Western analysts often fail to predict strategic surprises in their Middle 
East intelligence assessments. In general, Kam attributes the failure to the West’s lack of 
“sufficient comprehension of the political and social function of religious, ethnic, and 
319 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 4. 
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tribal affiliations, which affect the political order and sometimes undermine it.”320  Kam 
argues: “it is impossible to assess the policy of Islamic groups—including the Iranian 
leadership and organizations like Hizbollah and Hamas—in terms of Western realpolitik 
and rationalism alone.”321  Furthermore, with regard to Iran’s religious factor, Kam’s 
insight reflects many of the same characteristics that are found in the Cynefin’s 
complexity model. In particular, Kam reinforces the Cynefin complexity notion that 
Iran’s system is especially dynamic—that “it involves large numbers of interacting 
elements, the interactions are nonlinear, [and] the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts” (see Understanding Complexity table above).322  The following quote from Kam’s 
article, for example, underscores the above Cynefin complexity principles:   
The main difficulty in understanding Iran is the nature of the regime. 
Iran’s Supreme Leader, who is also its chief decision maker, is a cleric, 
and his way of thinking is not adequately understood…it is unclear what 
weight the various parties participating in the process have…It is 
especially unclear what weight the religious-ideological commandments 
have in the decision making process, and to what degree the Iranian 
leadership uses considerations regarded as rational according to Western 
criteria. It is true that decision making processes in other countries in the 
region are also insufficiently understood, but the case of Iran is much 
more significant, due to the leading role played by its religious leaders and 
the fundamentalist motivation in the process, and also due to Iran’s 
importance in the region.323  
Ephraim Kam, who is currently a senior a research fellow at Israel’s Institute for 
National Security Studies, concludes his article by offering an emergent theory to deal 
with faulty Middle East strategic assessments.  “In the end,” he writes, “it may be that the 
most practical way of coping with mistaken assessments is to take the possibility of 
strategic surprise into account, and prepare for it in advance.”324  While this may seem 
like a fatalistic approach, especially for Israel, preparedness may perhaps be the smartest 
320 Ephraim Kam, The Middle East as an Intelligence Challenge, Strategic Assessment (The Institute 
for National Security Studies, January 2014), 94, 
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6625. 
321 Ibid., 98. 
322 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 3. 
323 Kam, The Middle East as an Intelligence Challenge, 99–100. 
324 Ibid., 101. 
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approach. In the Cynefin framework, complex contexts represent the “domain of 
emergence,” where “at least one right answer exists...however, right answers can’t be 
ferreted out.”325  For the United States and Israel, therefore, dealing with Iran through the 
Cynefin complex system calls for leaders and analysts to work collaboratively in an effort 
to “probe, sense, and respond” and continually “monitor for emergence.”326   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. homeland security enterprise has 
focused primarily on the threat from al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and potential follow on plots 
from overseas Sunni extremists. More recently, the United States is grappling with threats 
of less-sophisticated attacks by al-Qaeda-inspired homegrown violent extremists. These 
are all significant threats from Sunni extremists that need to be understood and disrupted. 
On the other hand, the potential homeland threat from Shia extremists is not well 
understood by the majority of U.S. homeland security practitioners. Since Iran is a state 
sponsor of terrorism—specifically through the IRGC Qods Force and Hezbollah—more 
must be done to understand Iran through research, context, and dialogue. Vali Nasr, 
author of The Shia Revival, believes that “when the dust settles, the center of gravity will 
no longer lie with the Arab-Sunni countries, but will be held by Shia ones…The United 
States does not know the Shia well. That will have to change, if for no better reason than 
that the Shia live on top of some the richest oil fields in the region.”327  While Nasr 
exaggerates his case (out of approximately 1.4 billion Muslims in the world, about 1.25 
billion are Sunni), the point is the United States needs to understand the Shia and, in 
particular, potential threats emanating from Shia extremists.328  
This thesis contributes, in a relatively small, but unique way, to knowing the Shia 
and to understanding Iran in the context of its religion. It offers an exploratory look at 
some of Iran’s narratives, sacred carriers, and religious tools as potential strategic 
325 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 5. 
326 Ibid., 7. 
327 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, Kindle Locations 
3287–3290. 
328 Moghaddam, Online Discussion, August 8, 2014. 
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justifications for aggression against the United States. While the scope of this study was 
narrowed in order to frame and answer one research question, there are many other 
questions and avenues of related research that should be explored. The following ideas 
and questions are offered as possible next steps in furtherance of this topic. 
1. Additional Research Questions and Gaps 
When considering Iran as a Shia Islamic state, there are many questions that 
require further exploration through sound research and analysis. Below are a few 
examples of potential research questions—mostly focusing on Shia end-times beliefs—
that emerged during this study, and were only partly answered, or fell outside the scope 
of this thesis.   
• Looking at the different factions within Twelver Shi’ism, which factions 
and which ayatollahs are the most millenarian in their beliefs?  Which 
ones have the most followers?  Which ones command the most respect and 
support by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)? 
• What are the IRGC leaders’ end-times beliefs?  
• Which hardline anti-U.S. Iranian leaders could feasibly come to power 
with strong millenarian beliefs?  Would they act on these beliefs if 
threatened by the U.S. and/or Israel? 
• Who of all the hardline, conservative leaders in Iran would promote the 
Islamic Republic to hasten the return of the Mahdi?  How would they do 
it? 
• What are the most prevalent and accepted apocalyptic Shia teachings 
coming out of the Shia religious centers of Qom, Iran and Najaf, Iraq? 
• Is there a process whereby Iran could radicalize toward an aggressive 
millenarian-based state based on actions and/or threats from the U.S. or 
Israel? 
• Assuming that for the Iranian Shia it is a matter of when, not if, the Mahdi 
will return, what are there trigger points or signs that might prompt Iran to 
take extreme action to hasten the Mahdi’s return?  
While the Internet offers a wealth of primary source materials in the English 
language—from Iran’s Supreme Leader to many of the leading ayatollahs within Shia 
Islam—there is also an abundance of information in Farsi and Arabic. While there was an 
exhaustive effort in this study to find as many relevant English-translated sources as 
possible, one of the primary gaps of this research was the unknown body of literature in 
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other languages—especially in Farsi. Moreover, as mentioned in the literature review, 
there are a few very good expository writings about Shia end-times beliefs (Sachedina 
and Amanat to name a few); however, with the Middle East transforming almost daily in 
Iraq and Syria, more contemporary works are needed that address Twelver Shia 
narratives and/or apocalyptic beliefs as they relate to Iran and the region.   
2. Possible Next Steps 
In line with some of the research questions, there are several ways to further 
explore the findings from this thesis. Some of these ideas could be developed as smaller 
works or natural extensions of this project. A few ideas, however, could be broad enough 
to stand alone as another thesis, dissertation or scholarly book. They are in no particular 
order. 
• A study of Shia Islamic ‘signs of the times’ specifically looking for the 
events that will precede the advent of the Mahdi. Have some of these 
events happened, and if so, how do the Iranian regime and the influential 
Shia ayatollahs interpret these events? 
• An examination of the Shia doctrine of taqqiya or ‘dissimulation’ as a 
religious tool. While taqqiya was not addressed in this thesis, Momen 
describes it as lawful “religious dissimulation [concealment] while 
maintaining mental reservation…[to be used] in situations where there is 
overwhelming danger of loss of life or property and where no danger to 
religion would occur thereby.”329  Does the current regime use and/or 
abuse the doctrine of taqqiya to justify deceiving or concealing 
information from the West?  Could taqqiya play a role in the current 
nuclear negotiations between the West and Iran?  
• An exploration of Shia Islamic doctrine with regard to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD)—in particular nuclear weapons. While this was only 
briefly discussed in chapter four, a further analysis of the topic could 
outline everything Iran’s two Supreme Leaders have said regarding the 
subject—its permissiveness, or lack thereof—as well as what other 
influential ayatollahs believe about the issue.  
• A social media analysis of Iran. While ordinary citizens of Iran are 
currently banned from using Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other social 
media outlets, Iran’s leaders use it extensively. Many Iranian citizens are, 
however, circumventing Iran’s Internet filter ban and finding ways to 
communicate via mainstream social media. A comprehensive “big data” 
329 Momen, An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism, 183. 
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analysis of social media in Iran could reveal much about what the 
leadership says, and whether or not the citizens accept or reject the 
regimes political and religious edict. 
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